


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## Gender and Right-Wing Populism: Analysing the Role of Women at the ministerial level

Lea Radke, Gila Rolofs<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract:

*The aim of this paper is to examine the role of women at the ministerial level in right-wing populist parties. To do so, we analyse the descriptive and substantive representation of women within the Hungarian and Polish right-wing populist cabinets. Using descriptive statistics, we examine the policy areas and relative prestige of their ministerial portfolios. To gain a deeper understanding of the role of women, we further provide an analysis of the roles of Beata Szydło as Polish prime minister and Katalin Novák as Minister without Portfolio for Families, Youth and the Elderly in Hungary. Within this analysis, we investigate their educational and political backgrounds and particularly focus on the gender aspects of their initiated family policies. Our results show that women within right-wing populist cabinets tend to govern traditionally 'male' and neutral policy areas; furthermore, they hold portfolios with similar prestige as do the men. The analysis of Beata Szydło and Katalin Novák indicates that women in executive offices are well educated and are more likely to become chief executives when their power is limited. Moreover, the investigation of the family policies demonstrates that they predominantly support the preservation of traditional family roles and strengthen them implicitly.*

**Key words:** *Right-wing populism; Political representation of women; Gender politics; Women in the executive; Poland; Hungary*

### Introduction

Over the past ten years, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have witnessed a renewed rise of (semi-) authoritarian politics. In a process variously referred to as democratic backsliding or de-consolidation, erstwhile champions of democracy such as Hungary and Poland have rolled back civil liberties, judicial independence, and media freedom (Bucholc 2019; Enyedi 2018; Przybylski 2018; Sadurski 2018; Śledzińska-Simon, 2018; Urbinati 2019). Part and parcel of these developments has not only been a dismantling of gender equality policies but also the passage of legislation restricting access to abortion and limiting the work of feminist organisations (Gwiazda 2019; Korolczuk, Graff 2018; Kováts 2020; Krizsan, Roggeband 2018; Żuk, Żuk 2017). Both phenomena are related to the increasing success of right-wing populist parties, who favour traditional family gender roles that confine women to their role as housewives and mothers (Dietze, Roth 2020; Eksi, Wood 2019; Mudde 2007). Hungary's *Fidesz* and Poland's *Law and Justice (PiS)* are no exception

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here. Their leaders have long publicly expressed their rejection of what they call “genderization” and consequently refused, among others, to ratify the Istanbul Convention against violence against women (Graff 2020; Gwiazda 2019; Kováts 2020).

These parties are clearly male dominated in terms of their elected representatives in parliament and advocate traditional gender roles. In their view, women’s tasks are limited to taking care of the family and the household. Consequently, politics should be dominated by male decision-makers (Mudde, 2007). However, we still can find female ministers within the Hungarian and Polish cabinets. Poland even had a female prime minister from 2015 to 2017, and Katalin Novák currently serves as Hungary’s president. This contradiction raises the question *what kind of political role do women play in government parties well known for their anti-gender values?*

To date, research mostly focuses on the relationship between gender and the executive in general and on the mechanisms of how women are appointed to executive office. While the political system seems to be the most important factor, party ideology and the cabinet system can also influence the number of women as chief executives and cabinet members (Jalazai 2008; Annesley, Franceschet 2015; Bauer, Tremblay 2011; Claveria 2014). Particularly studies on right-wing populism mostly concentrate on the connection with nationalistic or culturalist issues. Only a few studies analyse the relationship between right-wing populism and gender (see e.g., Rashkova, Zankina 2017; Dietze 2020). However, it is still not plausible why women within right-wing populist parties hold positions which, according to their anti-gender values, are attributed to men.

Our paper seeks to fill this gap by providing an exploratory analysis of the role of women in the Hungarian and Polish right-wing populist governments. Relying on insights from previous studies on political executives and right-wing populism, we argue that women within right-wing populist cabinets are more likely to be appointed to ‘male’ policy areas. Moreover, we assume that female cabinet members represent especially conservative women’s issues within their ministerial offices. Our analysis then differentiates between descriptive and substantive representation to gauge the role of women in *Fidesz* and *PiS*. In a first step, we provide an overview of the descriptive representation of women within the Polish and Hungarian executives and compare it to the situation in other CEE countries. Furthermore, we analyse whether female ministers within the Hungarian and Polish government govern primarily female, neutral or male policy areas and how the importance and prestige of their ministries compare to those of their male counterparts. The second step of the analysis – a qualitative analysis of the role of Beata Szydło as Polish prime minister (2015–2017) and Katalin Novák’s as Minister without Portfolio for Families, Youth and the Elderly since 2022, her time as State Secretary at the Ministry of Human Resources and as vice president of the right-wing populist *Fidesz* party in Hungary – then allows us to gain a deeper understanding of the role of women within right-wing populist governments. In particular, we focus on how they substantively represent women within their ministerial offices. Therefore, we firstly examine their educational background, their political experience and how they were appointed. Secondly, we analyse the gender aspect of policies regarding family issues that they implemented.

Our results show that the relative number of female ministers, especially in Hungary, is comparatively low, although other countries in CEE show similar patterns. The Polish cabinet, with four female ministers, is among the average in the region, but with a percentage of female ministers of 16.66% it is still far from parity. Furthermore, women within

right-wing populist cabinets tend to occupy male and neutral policy areas, and they hold portfolios with similar prestige as men. However, the appointment of Beata Szydło as prime minister by Jarosław Kaczyński shows that her position as prime minister rather serves as window-dressing than reflecting her actual influence. In this sense, it might be relevant for future research to examine the role and function of Katalin Novák as the current Hungarian president. It is possible that similar reasons as in Poland can be identified. The analysis of their implemented policies demonstrates that the substantive representation of women in these cabinets is based on traditional gender roles. Overall, our findings contribute to the growing, yet still limited literature on the relationship between far-right populism and gender. We conclude by outlining further trajectories for future research.

### **Women and the executive: the role of right-wing populism**

The head of the state or the chief executive is one of the most visible political actors. This part of government is dominated by men, and the executive branch in general is male dominated (Annesley, Franceschet 2015; Bauer, Tremblay 2011; Claveria 2014; O'Brien, Reyes-Housholder 2018). Most research focuses on the question of how and when women enter executive office. The most important factor seems to be the structure of the political system (Annesley, Franceschet 2015; Bauer, Tremblay 2011; Claveria 2014; Field 2020; Jalazai 2008). For instance, in specialist cabinet systems, in which ministers are chosen for their expertise rather than their political skills and professional experience, the number of women rises (Bauer, Tremblay 2011; Claveria 2014). Women are more likely to be elected or appointed prime minister or president when their power is relatively limited, as is the case in political systems with fragmented executive power (Annesley, Franceschet 2015; Jalazai 2008).

Other political factors, such as party ideology, cabinet system and politically unstable contexts, can likewise influence the number of women as chief of the executive (Annesley, Franceschet 2015; Bauer, Tremblay 2011; Claveria 2014; Jalazai 2008). Worldwide, left-wing parties are more likely to appoint women into cabinets than are right-wing parties (Bauer, Tremblay 2011; Claveria 2014). The party ideology can also include specific gender quotas, which are more likely to be found in left-wing parties as well (Claveria 2014). Also, women are more likely to enter executive office when they are members of privileged groups and have an education that is above average (Bauer, Tremblay 2011; Jalazai 2008).

The total number of women in executive office has been increasing over time (O'Brien, Reyes-Housholder 2018; Bego 2014; Jacob et al. 2014; Claveria 2014) and nearly doubled from 1999–2010 (Bauer, Tremblay 2011). Nevertheless, Claveria (2014) still finds significant differences between countries. Jacob et al. (2014) argue that a “gender-balanced decision making” norm has become embedded in politics worldwide. This strongly influences the executive branch even more than the legislature. Therefore, women’s representation has increased over time, but more visibly so in low-prestige portfolios than in high-prestige portfolios (Jacob et al. 2014; see also Riethmüller 2021).

The number of women in government is not the only relevant factor for the representation of women (Goddard 2019; Riethmüller 2021; Barnes, O'Brien 2018; Rashkova, Zankina 2019) because not all ministries are of the same importance. The difference in importance between the ministries depends on the party ideology or on the influence the department can have (Riethmüller 2021). Previous research distinguished between ‘core’ ministries, high and low prestige, or the salience of a ministry (Goddard 2019;

Riethmüller 2021). Goddard (2019) states that the party ideology is the leading influence on the appointment of women to a cabinet post through the party leaders. Beside the fact that women in general are less likely to be appointed to 'core' ministries or ministries with a high salience, those effects are smaller in left-wing governments. While voters' progressive gender attitudes are the main reason for the latter, the large discrepancy in the number of male and female ministers in core ministries generally results from the established internal party networks, which are predominantly male dominated (Goddard 2019).

The definition of a core ministry can change depending on the party ideology, yet it is usually possible to distinguish clearly between traditionally female and male ministries (Krook, O'Brien 2012; Goddard 2019). Ministries that are classified as female are often linked to 'classic female' issues (Krook, O'Brien 2012; Goddard 2019). It should be emphasized that the ministries defined as female often coincide with low-prestige ministries; whereas traditionally male ministries, such as the ministries of Defence, Economy, and Foreign Affairs, are seen as high prestige ministries (Krook, O'Brien 2012).

Extensive research to date has found that women are more likely to be appointed as ministers in left-wing governments than in right-wing governments. Moreover, in left-wing governments women are more likely to be appointed to classically 'male' portfolios (Goddard 2019; Barnes, O'Brien 2018). Looking at specific regions, these effects can erode. Rashkova and Zankina (2019) found in their cross-national research in South-Eastern Europe that the number of women in the cabinet depends on the institutionalization of the ruling party. Within this region, women tend to hold low-prestige ministries. Classically male ministries or high-prestige ministries are also held by women, but then usually appointed by right-wing parties (Rashkova, Zankina 2019). The right-wing parties have a lower level of institutionalization than the old communist parties, so the male-dominated internal party structures are not as pronounced and more permeable to women (Rashkova, Zankina 2019). Bego (2014) comes to similar conclusions. Left-wing parties do not automatically appoint more female ministers in Central and Eastern Europe. The historical context of this region influences the divergent results in contrast to other regions. For example, unlike in other regions, the labour market and the number of women in parliament do not influence the number of women in the cabinet (Bego 2014), whereas higher education leads to a higher number of women in the cabinet and to a higher number of women in high-prestige portfolios. EU incentives can also lead to more women in the cabinet, but this effect diminishes after membership (Bego 2014). The review above has shown that factors explaining the number of women in executive positions have already been explored in detail. Nevertheless, the question of what role women play in right-wing populist governments remains. In order to answer this question, the next section takes a closer look at the connection between right-wing populism and gender.

Populism refers primarily to a particular style of politics (Patternotte, Kuhar 2018), with an anti-elite, and popularly sovereign worldview. Mudde (2004) defines populism "*as an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people*" (Mudde 2004, p.544). Right-wing populism in particular is also associated with xenophobia, but usually does not refer to gender issues (Rahel 2017; Akkermann 2015; Patternotte, Kuhar 2018). Right-wing populist parties can be further distinguished in terms of their ideology. National right-wing populist parties focus on cultural, religious and ethnic issues, whereas neoliberal



right-wing populist parties focus on economic issues (Mügge, DeLange 2015). Nevertheless, the differences between these two types have largely eroded as “[...] *national populist parties have increasingly been resorting to liberal democratic arguments to defend their opposition to immigration*” (Mügge; DeLange 2015, p. 65) to increase their acceptance among mainstream parties and voters. The term right-wing populist parties often refers to non-radical right-wing parties. However, they differ in terms of their focus, i.e., non-radical right-wing parties often refer to the nation instead of ‘the people’ (Mudde 2004).

Mudde (2015) identifies a consistent view on gender in right-wing populist parties in Northern Europe and South America (Mügge, DeLange 2015). According to this, gender issues are always linked to family policy. The ‘natural’ difference between the sexes must be understood, accepted and preserved and the protection of women by the state is of particular importance, as they are the only ones who can give birth (Mügge, DeLange 2015). A number of scholars have identified a consistently conservative worldview among right-wing populist parties (Akkermann 2015; Rashkova, Zankina 2017; Kováts 2018; DeLange, Mügge 2015). This does not only include concrete opinions on different gender roles but also includes the parties’ positions on LGBTQ rights (Patternotte, Kuhar 2018). The conservative worldview leads to a clear opinion regarding role distributions within families and societies. Women are understood as caring mothers for families consisting of mothers, fathers and children (Akkermann 2015; Rashkova, Zankina 2017; Kováts 2018; DeLange, Mügge 2015). This image of women as ‘caretakers’ is essential for the conservative and right-wing populist understanding of gender (DeLange, Mügge 2015).

Kováts (2018) highlights other strategies of right-wing populist parties. The ‘fight against leftist gender ideology’ is not the main concern. They rather use this worldview to position themselves against progressive, mostly leftist voices. In some cases, they present themselves as protectors of women and LGBTQ rights, always in conjunction with a racist or anti-Islam connotation (Akkermann 2015; Mügge, DeLange 2015; Stoltz 2021). Anti-gender campaigns actually originated from Catholic Church initiatives (Patternotte, Kuhar 2018; Kováts 2018) but were appropriated by right-wing populist parties and in some cases, depending on government participation, became a governmental priority (Patternotte, Kuhar 2018).

This worldview and the strategy of staging oneself as a protector can be observed in several country-specific studies (Zankina, Rashkova 2017; Kriszan, Roggeband 2018a; Kriszan, Roggeband 2018b; Grzebalska, Pető 2017). Rashkova and Zankina (2017) found that Bulgarian politicians from right-wing populist parties addressed women-specific issues in parliament more often than did politicians from other parties. In terms of content, however, they always served the typical conservative gender image. Kriszan and Roggeband (2018) identified a clear degradation of women’s policies in Central and Eastern Europe. The de-democratization of a state thus leads to a dismantling of equality (Kriszan, Roggeband 2018a; Kriszan, Roggeband 2018b). In Hungary, feminist organizations are understood as a foreign attack that threatens the security of the state and as an attack on the traditional family (Kriszan, Roggeband 2018b). Grzebalska and Pető (2017) confirm these findings. They identify a close link between illiberal transformation and anti-gender policies for Poland and Hungary. The ruling parties there use the notion of traditional family values to strengthen their position in politics.

While both phenomena have been studied in isolation, less light has been shed so far on the combination of analysing the role of women in far-right populist governments. There has been extensive research on the circumstances under which women participate in

executives, how many women there are in them, and what portfolios they cover. Regional differences due to historical and cultural factors have also been considered in detail. The political positions taken by right-wing populist parties on women's issues and gender have been studied. However, research questions at the intersection of these literatures requires further investigation.

## Theoretical Framework

To gain a deeper understanding of the role of women in right wing populist governments, creating a theoretical framework of the underlying concepts is imperative. In the following, we outline a framework for our analysis that highlights relevant variables and formulates some expectations to guide the – partially exploratory – analysis.

In order to assess the role of women in right-wing populist governments, we link different concepts: On the one hand the specific view on gender in right-wing populist parties and on the other hand the concept of representation. We hypothesize that the attitude of right-wing populist parties to gender issues shapes and influences the role of women in their governments. As already explained, a traditionally conservative gender image can be identified in right-wing populist parties. Mudde (2015) has argued that within this, gender issues mainly fall under family issues. This would support the role of women as caring mothers. Furthermore, the 'natural' differences between the sexes should be understood, accepted and preserved. The protection of the female body by the state is of importance to ensure the births of children. All three essential elements aim to preserve a traditional family image (Mügge, DeLange 2015). The party leaders of right-wing populist parties have long expressed their "anti-gender position" through the support of traditional family gender roles, restricting reproductive rights, removing accreditation from gender studies, questioning sex education, and same sex marriage (Dietze, Roth 2020; Kováts 2018). However, it is not obvious why women in right-wing populist parties hold positions that, according to their understanding of gender, should be filled by men.

For our approach, it is necessary to specify the concept of representation in more detail, to later work out what role women play in the governments under study. In general, a distinction is made between two types of representation. Descriptive representation refers to descriptive characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, religion, or level of education. Substantive representation refers to the promotion of women's interests and issues (Celis, Childs 2008; Wängnerud 2009; Gwiazda 2021; Pitkin 1967). In the process, conservative positions were often not accepted as substantive representation of women. Whether conservative positions are understood as 'acting for women' depends on how feminism is understood (Celis, Childs 2012). In order to gain a deeper understanding of whether or not women in conservative or even right-wing populist governments are 'acting for women' it is useful to examine their policy implementations more closely. Thereby, one should pay particular attention to whether their policies represent only a certain group of women or whether they are aimed at the general equality of women (Celis, Childs 2012). In this case, especially policies regarding women's traditional role as housewives and mothers are in the focus of our analysis. Since right-wing populist parties have a very specific idea of role distributions, we assume that the women who are in right-wing populist governments will occupy exactly this role, both on the descriptive level and on the substantive level.

Following the logic of the concept of representation to understand the role of women in right-wing populist governments, the first intuitive step is to examine descriptive representation. The existence of women as ministers contradicts the internal logic of the parties' ideological position on gender issues. Therefore, we expect that the number of female ministers in Poland and Hungary is small (particularly in comparison with other countries in CEE). However, if one wants to gain a better understanding of the role of women in government parties, not only the number of female ministers but the different ministries occupied by women is relevant. Thereby, it is more difficult to formulate expectations about the distribution of portfolios. Considering the historical context of this region, women are not generally expected to be assigned specifically female or low-prestige portfolios, even if they get appointed by right-wing populist parties (Bego 2014). Because the right-wing parties have a lower level of institutionalization than the old communist parties, the male-dominated internal party structures are not as pronounced and more permeable to women (Rashkova, Zankina 2019). Therefore, we expect to see an even distribution across portfolio classifications. To understand the role of women ministers within governments, it is also insightful to trace their careers. We assume that the few female ministers will have a high level of education and will not be political outsiders but will have been active within the party for some time, because women are more likely to enter executive office when they are members of privileged groups and have an education that is above average (Bauer, Tremblay 2011; Jalazai 2008).

Consequently, we argue that these female ministers as members of right-wing populist governments are also willing to introduce policies within their ministerial office that support mainly conservative interests. The substantive representation of women by these ministers is accordingly reduced to the support of women in their roles as housewives and mothers. We expect these values to be reflected in the policies implemented. In order to classify the policies under study, we refer to Saxonberg's (2013) concept of genderization and degenderization. This concept, which was explicitly developed for family policy, can be optimally integrated into our theoretical framework because it distinguishes between two types of policies. Gendering policies aim to promote traditional role distributions within families. Degendering policies seek to overturn them. Moreover, these policies can be explicit or implicit. Explicit gendering policies openly aim to maintain the strict division of roles between women and men. Others implicitly aim to do so because the structure they provide encourages this continuation. We will therefore analyse the policies according to whether they pursue the goal of working in the sense of the gender ideology of right-wing populist parties. In the following, we apply this twofold distinction as part of our analysis.

## **Data and Methods**

To examine the role of women in right-wing populist governments, we employ a qualitative methodology and analyse which kind of ministerial portfolios female ministers govern and how they get appointed to these ministries. In order to understand which gender understanding female ministers of right-wing populist parties represent, implemented policies are also analysed. Specifically, this study is based on a small-N approach. We have established the following criteria for the case selection. First and foremost, we are interested in women who are first members of right-wing populist government parties and who also head or have headed a ministry. In addition to the logical necessity of government partici-



pation, a regional limitation makes sense, as cultural and historical influences cannot be excluded. Poland and Hungary therefore serve as reasonable case selections. As members of the European Union, they are embedded in a similar political context. They share similar cultural and historical factors of influence and, with the *Law and Justice* party and the *Fidesz* party, each has right-wing populist participation in government (PopuList 2020). However, the two countries differ particularly in the number of female ministers and the distribution of ministries to women (see Table 1). For this reason, the analysis also serves the purpose of examining whether the role of women in the executive might diverge.

The investigation period is limited to those legislative periods in which the Hungarian *Fidesz* and the Polish *Law and Justice* parties formed governments. Therefore, we will investigate the time periods from 2010 until 2021 for the Hungarian government and 2015 until 2021 for the Polish government. In a first step, we provide a table showing the differences across CEE in 2022 with regard to the number of female ministers, the gender distribution of the current cabinet, and the Gender Power Score based on Krook and O'Brien (2012). Furthermore, the table integrates whether partly right-wing populist parties form the government. For the analysis of our theoretical considerations, we test (1) whether the portfolios women within the Polish and Hungarian governments lead are female, male, or neutral policy areas and (2) if these are low-prestige, medium-prestige, or high-prestige ones. The former is based on the typology by Krook and O'Brien (2012) and defines the *gender* of cabinet portfolios according to their affiliations with the public or private sphere of politics as well as their association with traditional gender roles. The latter is based on the analysis of portfolio saliences in the East European region by Druckman and Roberts (2007) and will be extended by the categorization of Krook and O'Brien (2012).

As the categorisation of Krook and O'Brien (2012) does not precisely include all the ministerial portfolios of the Hungarian and Polish female ministers, we assigned them to the most compatible main issue (See Appendix Table 4 & 5 for detailed information). For the analysis of portfolio salience of the ministries governed by female ministers, we used the expert survey carried out by Druckman and Roberts from 2007 and the categorization of Krook and O'Brien (2012). The investigation period from Druckman and Roberts (2007) differs from our own, so not all the ministries in our analysis are included by them. The same is the case for the categorization of Krook and O'Brien (2012). The study period of our analysis is limited to the years 2010–2022, and the categorizations applied here refer to the years 1990–2002 (Druckman, Roberts 2007) and to the year 2009 (Krook, O'Brien 2012). As ministries and their responsibilities change, we will apply the categorizations to the ministries that existed during our period of study; slight variations or overlaps between different ministries may be possible. By taking a more in-depth look at the formation of the ministries, we decided to assign the Polish and Hungarian ministries to those that are the closest thematically. Druckman and Roberts (2008) measure portfolio salience using a score. The average salience score for ministries is 1, which means that a ministry about average has a value of 1. More important or less important portfolios are assigned values above 1 or below 1. Krook and O'Brien (2012) break down ministries by gender and by prestige. They distinguish between male, neutral and female and high prestige, medium prestige and low prestige.

To gain a deeper understanding of the *role* of women in right-wing populist governments, we take a closer look at two selected female ministers with a comparatively higher political influence in the executive branch of right-wing populist parties than their female counterparts: the Polish prime minister from 2015 to 2017, Beata Szydło, and the current

Hungarian president, Katalin Novák.<sup>2</sup> It still stands to reason why they hold positions which, according to their understanding of gender, are attributed to men and if these positions really reflect their actual influence. Therefore, we will examine their educational background and political experiences and how they got appointed in a more detailed manner. We assume that these female ministers do not substantively represent all interests of women and support mainly conservative interests, in order to be loyal to their party or party leaders. Therefore, we will investigate what kind of policies they have enacted and especially take a closer look at the gender aspects of said policies. The main aspect within the analysis about the role of Beata Szydło as prime minister consists of the family policy reforms initiated by her and the motives of the male leader of the *PiS* party to elect Beata Szydło as prime minister. Katalin Novák also worked on specific family issue policies during her time as State Secretary, which we will analyse in more detail. We are interested in the role these women play in their governments, so their staging and communication of content to the outside world is also of interest. It should be explicitly mentioned that no comprehensive policy analysis will be conducted. Rather, the focus is on the exploratory identification of patterns.

### ***Women's Representation in the Hungarian and Polish Cabinets***

The first step is an overview of the descriptive representation of women. We compare the absolute number of female ministers in Poland and Hungary compared to other CEE countries and add for each region the Gender Power Score by Krook and O'Brien (2012). Over the period of study, Poland and Hungary occupy very different positions within the region in terms of the equal distribution of ministries compared to other CEE countries (see Table 1). Due to the replacement of ministries in Poland in mid-2022, Morawiecki's current cabinet currently consists of four female and 21 male ministers. Compared to other CEE countries, the absolute number of female ministers in Poland is on average. Nevertheless, the percentage of female ministers (about 16.66%) does not demonstrate a parity cabinet. The gender power score of 1.71 also confirms that ministers are not appointed with equal representation. In a direct comparison, the cabinet of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has the lowest number of female ministers. The Gender Power Score of 0.57 is also the lowest within the CEE region. Judit Varga, as Minister of Justice, is currently the only female minister in Orbán's fifth cabinet.

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<sup>2</sup> Given that the election of Katalin Novák as president did not take place until early 2022, the analysis will be limited to her time as State Secretary at the Ministry of Human Resources (2014–2020), as Minister without Portfolio for Families, Youth and the Elderly (2020–2021), and as vice president of Fidesz (2017–2021).

**Table 1: Female Ministers in the CEE-Region**

Country	Ideological Background	Far-right Populist Governing Parties	Total Number of Female Ministers	Total Number of Ministries	Percentage of Female Ministers	Gender Power Score (0-12)*
Lithuania	Conservatism Christian Democracy	No	7	15	46.66%	3,46
Estonia	Liberalism	No	7	15	46.66%	3,67
Slovenia	Social Liberalism	No	7	18	38.88%	3,00
Croatia	Conservatism Christian Democracy	No	5	18	27.78%	1,88
Poland	National Conservatism Social Conservatism	Yes	4	25	16.66%	1,71
Latvia	Liberal Conservatism	No	2	14	14.29%	1,17
Bulgaria	Non-partisan	-	3	21	14.29%	1,74
Slovakia	Conservatism National Conservatism	Yes	2	16	12.50%	1,26
Czech Republic	Conservatism	No	2	17	11.76%	1,06
Romania	Social Democracy Liberal Conservatism	No	2	22	09.10%	0,57
Hungary	National Conservatism	Yes	1	17	05.88%	0,47

**Note:** \* The Gender Power Score shows the extent to which a cabinet is composed on a parity basis. It weights cabinet positions based on the number of women and the gender and prestige of the ministries to which they are assigned.

**Source:** Own elaboration based on Nordieck, 2022; PopuList, 2020 and Krook and O'Brien, 2012.

Compared to in other countries in the region, it is also clear that especially non-populist governments have a higher proportion of women in their cabinets. At 46.66%, the cabinets of Lithuania and Estonia even have almost equal representation.

Looking at the distribution of portfolio salience across the ministries led by women, no consistent picture emerges. Tables 2 and 3 show a list of all ministries led by women over our period of study in Poland and Hungary. First, it is striking that the salience score and the prestige classification are not always congruent. The Hungarian ministries led by women all have a salience score that is below the average of 1. Whereas the prestige classification of Krook and O'Brien (2012) identifies the whole range of low to high prestige portfolios within these four areas. In Poland, four of the sixteen ministries are above the average salience score of 1.

**Table 2: Saliency Score and Prestige Type of the ministerial portfolios in Hungary**

Ministerial Portfolio	Saliency Score	Prestige Type
Justice	0.95	Medium prestige
National Development	0.80	Medium prestige
Without Portfolio: Administration of State Assets	0.73	High prestige
Family and Social Affairs	0.73	Low prestige

**Source:** Own presentation of portfolio saliency of Hungarian ministries with female ministers based on Druckmann, Roberts 2007; Krook, O'Brien 2012.

These ministries are also classified as high-prestige portfolios. But even at this point, the assessments of the two classification types differ. It is therefore not possible to draw a uniform conclusion. In a nutshell, it can be stated that the saliency as well as the prestige-classifications vary. Women therefore occupy neither exclusively low-prestige nor exclusively high-prestige portfolios. However, in Hungary all female-led ministries have a below-average saliency score. Taking into account the 'gender aspect' of the portfolios, no concrete pattern emerges, as assumed (see Appendix). In fact, the majority of female ministers hold classically male or neutral portfolios. These observations confirm our assumptions about the descriptive representation of women in right-wing populist governments. The results on the descriptive representation of women in right-wing populist governments are not fully sufficient to adequately answer our research question. Nevertheless, it must be noted that Poland has a significantly higher number of female ministers in direct comparison to Hungary over the entire period of the study. However, the role women play in these governments also depends on the substantive orientation of their ministry during their term in office. In addition, a closer look at the respective women can be informative; how they got to their office and to what extent they put the substantive representation of women on their agenda will be analysed in the following section.

**Table 3: Saliency Score and Prestige Type of the ministerial portfolios in Poland**

Ministerial Portfolio	Saliency Score	Prestige Type
Prime Minister	2.21	High prestige
Finance	1.73	High prestige
Deputy Prime Minister	1.42	High prestige
Interior and Administration	1.39	High prestige
Family, Labour and Social Policy	0.98	Low prestige
Without Portfolio: Chief of the Political Cabinet of the Prime Minister	0.98	High prestige
Without Portfolio: Chief of the Chancellery of Prime Minister	0.98	High prestige
Without Portfolio: Chief of the Council of Ministers	0.98	High prestige
Without Portfolio: Coordinator for Humanitarian Aid and Refugee Affairs	0.97	Low prestige
Sports	0.83	Low prestige
National Education	0.83	Medium prestige
Digitalisation	0.72	Medium prestige
Development	0.72	Medium prestige

Ministerial Portfolio	Salience Score	Prestige Type
Funds and Regional Policy	0.72	Medium prestige
Climate and Environment	0.71	Medium prestige
Entrepreneurship and Technology	0.59	Low prestige

**Source:** Own presentation of portfolio salience of Polish ministries with female ministers based on Druckmann and Roberts, 2007; Krook and O'Brien 2012.

## The Role of Women in *PiS* and *Fidesz*: Beata Szydło and Katalin Novák compared

Since the descriptive representation of women is not sufficient to prove if and how women's interests get represented within the executive, it is important to analyse how the substantive representation of women occurs. In order to do so, we will take a deeper look at the role of Beata Szydło, Polish Prime Minister from 2015 to 2017, and Katalin Novák, Hungarian Minister without Portfolio for Families, Youth and the Elderly from October 2020. In a first step, we will describe their educational and political backgrounds and how they got appointed. In a second step, we relate their topic agenda-setting and policies to our theoretical framework.

### Beata Szydło

Beata Szydło studied Ethnography at the Jagiellonian University of Krakow. After graduating, she was a PhD student at the Philosophy and History Faculty in Krakow. Subsequently, she completed post-graduate studies for managers of culture at the Warsaw School of Economics and at the University of Economics in Krakow. Consequently, she has a high level of education. Her political career started in 1998 as mayor of Brzeszcze, a town in the administrative district of Oswiecimski in southern Poland. Holding this position for seven years, in 2005 she joined the *Law and Justice* (*PiS*) party and was elected to the Sejm, the lower house of the parliament of Poland. From 2014 to 2015 she has been party treasures. During the presidential election in 2015, Szydło operated as a campaign manager for Andrzej Duda. After his election victory, the party leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski nominated Beata Szydło for the post of prime minister within the parliamentary election in October 2015. Before her subsequent appointment, she had not held any position within the executive branch, however she formerly belonged to the select executive group of her party (Mam Prawo Wiedziec 2021; Zuba 2020).

Within the media and the scientific debate, the role of Beata Szydło was reduced to the role of a vicarious agent for Kaczynski, whose own nomination was not up for debate because of his low popularity ratings (Bensch, 2016; Easton, 2015; Zuba, 2020). Moreover, her appointment was considered to be part of a political strategy through which the political image of the party as a radical party was softened. For Zuba (2020) these conditions indicate a "surrogate government" in which the prime minister is under the control of the party leader and the centre of the executive is located outside a constitutionally defined government. Consequently, the position of Beata Szydło as prime minister did not reflect her actual influence. However, in her first statement of government policy in 2015 Szydło already emphasised that family would be one of her main themes during her term as prime minister. This included the change of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy to the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy. Moreover, Szydło initiated several family policies reforms in cooperation with the minister that ministry, Elżbieta Rafalska (Promocji, 2015).



The document “Family is the best investment” includes these policy reforms and was published by the Ministry of Family, Social and Labour Policy as part of the Family Rights Day Celebration under the Honorary Patronage in October 2017. As we focus especially on policies regarding the traditional views of family and gender roles, we will mainly concentrate on the following instruments: 1. “Family 500 +”, “For Life”, “Toddler +” and the Lowering of the Retirement age. In addition, we will present the statement of Beata Szydło regarding the importance of family at the beginning of the document (Ministry of Family, Labour, and Social Policy, 2017).<sup>3</sup>

The presented family policies and the individual statement of Beata Szydło indicate that a traditional family is favoured. Szydło already emphasises within her statement that family constitutes the foundation of the state, while it becomes a priority for her term of office as prime minister. Szydło perceives family primarily as a community of generations, like grandparents, parents, siblings, and children. Moreover, she argues that having many children is a reason to be proud and that she hopes by virtue of the “Family 500 +” programme Poles would decide to have additional offspring. Consequently, Poland would be able to develop steadily. For her, the fate of the Polish State is in the hands of Polish families. Within her closing words, Szydło underlines that her government would continue to work diligently to ensure the safety and well-being of Polish families.

The “Family 500+” programme was introduced in 2016 as a child cash benefit. It is based on a benefit of about 500 PLN per month for every second and additional child. Families whose income per person is not higher than 800 PLN or in the case of families with disabled children not higher than 1,200 PLN receive the financial aid also if they only have one child. Within the presentation, they stress the government’s effective defence of the rights of Polish families. An additional programme consists of the “For Life” programme, which was adopted in 2016. It offers comprehensive support for families raising disabled children and for women during pregnancy and after childbirth. In case of the birth of a child with a severe and irreversible handicap or with an incurable life-threatening disease, the government offers a one-time benefit of 4,000 PLN. The “Toddler +” as a departmental programme is based on a co-financing of primarily private childcare institutions. However, the government plan an investment of 500 million PLN for the creation of new childcare places, as well as for reducing the parents fee to 400 PLN per month. Moreover, the government under prime minister Beata Szydło reduces the retirement age for women to 60 and for men to 65 years. As she underlines within her statement, it was aimed at giving seniors more time to devote to their grandchildren.

While the “Family 500 +” programme does serve women’s gender interests linked to children’s wellbeing and household welfare, some scholars perceive it as a tool to promote patriarchal family models by keeping women out of the job market (Grzebalska, Pető, 2018; Snitow, Detwiler, 2016; Suwada, 2021; Szczygielska, 2019). While the government promises an investment of around 500 million PLN for childcare institutions, in 2019 only 10.2% of the children under three years enrolled in care institutions (Eurostat 2019). Consequently, the government lacked in providing public and private childcare institutions and enforced the caring function of the family and particularly of women as mothers. In the case of the “For Life” programme, the government supports families in caring for their disabled children, while all the listed conditions would legitimise an abortion at this time. It also reflects Szydło’s reaction during the abortion debate in 2016, where she first supported an ultraconservative

<sup>3</sup> Knowing that this specific selection of documents limits our findings and requires contextualisation, it offers the most likely case to analyse the understanding of gender and family roles of Beata Szydło.

proposal law. She merely withdrew her statement after massive demonstrations within Poland occurred (Polskie Radio, 2016; The Guardian, 2016). Also, the divergent lowering of the retirement age for women at their 60<sup>th</sup> birthday and for men at their 65<sup>th</sup> birthday in year 2016 indicated for the feminist scholars a reinforcement of the traditional family model by women exploring their care work potential as grandmothers (Grzebalska, Pető, 2018).

Nevertheless, within the analysed document we cannot identify a promoted division of roles between men and women. Rather it refers generally to the family without explicitly naming women as caregivers. However, it becomes clear that a traditional family model is favoured by Beata Szydło and that the reinforcement of this model seemed to be her main goal during her term as prime minister. Consequently, the substantive representation of women is predominantly reduced to family issues and limited by a conservative understanding of gender. Therefore, we define the presented policy instruments based on Saxonberg (2013) as implicitly gendering policies, which contribute to a gender unequal society through the presented family policy reform initiated by Beata Szydło.

### **Katalin Novák**

Katalin Novák was appointed as Minister without Portfolio for Families, Youth and the Elderly in Hungary in October 2020. Previously, she served as State Secretary at the Ministry of Human Resources, where she played a key role in overseeing family policy. Novák has a degree in economics and studied in Budapest and France. She has studied not only in Hungary but also in other countries and speaks four languages. Thus, she can show a very high level of education (Hungarian Government 2019). It is also notable that she is the vice president of the right-wing populist *Fidesz* party. The close cooperation and connection to a strong male character within the right-wing populist party is not insignificant. Research on women as chief executives has shown that they are more likely to attain such office when power is limited and they share it with a male politician (Jalazai 2008). While this research does not generally refer to women in the executive, right-wing populist parties are strongly male dominated. However, as vice president of the *Fidesz* party, she holds an important office in a right-wing populist party alongside a “strong” male party leader.

In a 2016 paper published in the OECD Yearbook, she describes a series of family policy measures implemented by her ruling party, for which she shares responsibility as Secretary of State. The measures are primarily aimed at dealing with demographic change. While the population is getting older, the birth rate is not rising (Novák 2016). To counter this trend, the Hungarian government wants to support young families. Novák (2016) sees the cause of the low birth rate in unstable partnerships, lack of housing, financial challenges, and women’s career plans. Therefore, the government introduced an income tax exemption for families with three or more children. In addition, a three-year paid parental leave and an expansion of childcare to encourage women to re-enter the labour market beforehand is introduced. If one evaluates these lists of measures and takes into account the gendering and degendering concept of Saxonberg (2013), one can see that these measures do not aim at a concrete role distribution for women and men. The emphasis is on strengthening young families, and incentives have been created to integrate women into the labour market at an early stage. Nevertheless, there is no concrete emphasis on the possibility for men to take paid parental leave. These policies thus have at most an implicit effect on the prevailing distribution of roles between women and men. Nevertheless, increasing the birth rate

requires women to take maternity leave, at least for a short period of time. The financial relief applies primarily to families with three or more children. Therefore, they would only apply to families in which the woman had to pause her employment relatively often. The policies are gendering policies, yet at this point they only have an implicit effect.

In press releases and statements compiled by the Hungarian government, Novák sorts through these measures. In these, the gender ideology of Novák, or her party, becomes clear. On the one hand, Novák clarifies her understanding of a traditional family and “called for the preservation of traditional family values and that marriage was defined by the union of a man and woman” (Hungarian government 2021) At this point, an explicit gendering policy can be identified that presupposes a clearly traditional image of the family. It also strongly distinguishes Hungarian families from immigrant families. Hungary sees its policy as a countermeasure to demographic change for exclusively Hungarian individuals. Immigration as a countermeasure would be counterproductive. For Novák, the solution lies “not in importing outsiders, but in strengthening internal resources” (Novák 2018) and in “protecting the institution of the family in its current form” (Hungarian government 2018).

At this point, it becomes clear how the gender ideology of the right-wing populist party works. Novák’s justification or rationale for her policy falls into an overarching pattern. The fact that the policies and statements examined in more detail here relate to family policy does not allow any conclusions to be drawn, as Novák was Minister for Families. However, the policies implicitly promote a structure aimed at preserving traditional families – even explicitly, if the attitude towards LGBTQ families is taken into account. She does not comment on the protection of the female body, but she positively emphasizes the decreasing abortion rates (Novák 2020). Most striking, however, is the clear stance against immigration. At first glance, family policy and immigration policy hardly overlap. Novák and the right-wing populist government of Hungary enact concrete policies to strengthen Hungarian families so that they do not have to rely on labour immigration. This bundle of policies cannot be understood solely as a women’s issue. It aims at a higher goal. The strong anti-immigration policy is hidden under the pretext of strengthening local families and thus women. Therefore, it can be reasonably assumed that these policies are not aimed at degendering the state, but rather strengthening women in their role as mothers in order to increase the birth rate of Hungarian women.

As assumed, Katalin Novák is an educated politician who expresses her party’s gender ideology within the government through her policies and her own staging. The substantive representation of women is limited to family policy and the reproduction of classical role distributions. It is clear that not all women’s interests are equally represented, but that the substantial representation of conservative convictions is in the foreground.

In conclusion, our analysis has shown that the absolute number of female ministers is relatively low. No concrete picture emerges in the classification according to high- or low-prestige portfolios. Female ministers in the right-wing populist governments of Poland and Hungary do not occupy exclusively female portfolios. The analysis of Novák and Szydło shows more detailed results. Both women place the classic division of roles between women and men within families more or less at the forefront of their agendas. The substantial representation of women is strongly limited to family issues, within which women are also assigned a very specific role. The preservation and promotion of classic family models is one of the main concerns of both female politicians. It can be seen that, in these two cases, the assumption that women within right-wing populist governments engage in the implementation of classical family policies could be verified.

## Conclusion

The aim of this article was to examine the role of women within right-wing populist governments in Poland and Hungary. Our expectations about the descriptive representation of women in right-wing populist parties were largely confirmed. In particular, we found that while the absolute number of women in cabinet posts was comparatively low, they held high-prestige as well as medium- and low-prestige portfolios. Women in Hungary and Poland also tend to occupy male or neutral portfolios rather than classically female ones. Thus, our study is in line with previous research findings and was able to corroborate them (Rashkova, Zankina 2019; Bego 2014). Our in-depth analysis of two women in right-wing populist governments indicates that women in executive offices are well educated and that they are more likely to become chief executives when their power is limited. Szydło and Novák are both associated with their party leaders. Szydło's government has been described as a "surrogate government" (Zuba 2020), while Novák, as party vice-president, has a close relationship with her party and its leader. Thus, their success or careers within governments can be traced directly to the male party leaders. It can be reasonably assumed that their power within the party or within their term of office was limited and was intended to help the party and its goals. Women in executive offices are usually appointed to office by a man, as with Beata Szydło (Jalazai 2008). Relating this to our theoretical framework, the analysis of Beata Szydło and Katalin Novák showed that they predominantly support the preservation of traditional family roles and strengthen them both implicitly and explicitly. The fact that women in right-wing populist governments focus on conservative interests is thus congruent with the findings of Gwiazda (2019, 2020). It has shown that the gender ideology of right-wing populist parties fits the familiar pattern according to Mudde (2015). Women's policy is equated with family policy, the natural difference between the sexes is to be preserved, and the protection of women by the state is of great importance. Right-wing populist parties use their anti-immigration and anti-Islam policies to present themselves as protectors of women. Although it was not possible to identify an explicit anti-Islam or anti-immigration stance, Katalin Novák's repeated reference to the strengthening of Hungarian families could be a reference to this. In order to confirm this assumption, it would be necessary to analyse further policies of the Hungarian government with regard to such positions.

It should be noted that the policies analysed cannot necessarily be used to draw conclusions about the government's overall policies. However, a closer look at the policies of right-wing populist women did reveal a pattern with regard to women's issues. This allows us to generate hypotheses that can be tested in future research. It can be assumed that the embodiment of conservative gender views can be seen in most women in right-wing populist governments. For confirmation, a larger cross-national study would need to be conducted. A study of other regions would also be useful in order to make results generalizable. While it was possible to identify how the ideological positions of right-wing populist parties on gender affected the role of women in such governments and influenced them and their policies, it must be emphasized that further quantitative as well as qualitative research would be useful.

Future research should further investigate the number of specific policies in female-led ministries that explicitly address women's issues. This should be followed by an in-depth qualitative analysis of these policies, looking not only at their intentions but also at their concrete impact on women's lives.

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## Appendix:

**Table 1: Female Cabinet Members in Poland 2015 - present**

<i><b>Cabinet of Mateusz Morawiecki II 2019 - present</b></i>			
<b>Politician's Name</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Ministerial Portfolio</b>	<b>Terms of Office</b>
<b>Jadwiga Emilewicz</b>	Agreement	1. Development 2. Deputy Prime Minister	11.2019 - 10.2020 04.2020 - 10.2020
<b>Marlena Maląg</b>	Law and Justice	1. Labour 2. Family and Social Policy	11.2019 - 06.2020 11.2019 - present
<b>Malgorzata Jarosińska-Jedynak</b>	Independent	Funds and Regional Policy	11.2019 – 10.2020
<b>Danuta Dmowska-Andrezejuk</b>	Independent	Sports	12.2019 – 10.2020
<b>Anna Moskwa</b>	Independent	Climate and Environment	Since 10.2021
<b>Magdalena Rzeczkowska</b>	Independent	Finance	Since 04.2022
<b>Agnieszka Scigaj</b>	Polish Affairs	Member of the Council of minister	Since 06.2022
<i><b>Cabinet of Mateusz Morawiecki I 2017 – 2019</b></i>			
<b>Politician's Name</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Ministerial Portfolio</b>	<b>Terms of Office</b>
<b>Beata Szydło</b>	Law and Justice	Deputy Prime Minister	12.2017 – 06.2019
<b>Anna Zalewska</b>	Law and Justice	Education	12.2017 – 06.2019
<b>Anna Strezyńska</b>	Independent	Digitalisation	12.2017 – 01.2018
<b>Elżbieta Rafalska</b>	Law and Justice	Family, Labour and Social Policy	12.2017 – 06.2019
<b>Bożena Borys-Szopa</b>	Law and Justice	Family, Labour and Social Policy	06.2019 – 11.2019
<b>Teresa Czerwinska</b>	Independent	Finance	01.2018 – 06.2019
<b>Elżbieta Witek</b>	Law and Justice	1. Interior and Administration 2. Without Portfolio: Chief of the Council of Ministers	06.2019 – 08.2019 12.2017 – 12.2017
<b>Jadwiga Emilewicz</b>	Agreement	Entrepreneurship and Technology	01.2018 – 11.2019
<b>Beata Kempa</b>	United Poland	1. Without Portfolio: Chief of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister 2. Without Portfolio: Coordinator for Humanitarian Aid and Refugee Affairs	12.2017 – 12.2017 12.2017 – 06.2019
<i><b>Cabinet of Beata Szydło 2015 – 2017</b></i>			
<b>Politician's Name</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Ministerial Portfolio</b>	<b>Term of Office</b>
<b>Anna Strezyńska</b>	Independent	Digitalisation	11.2015 – 12.2017



<b>Anna Zalewska</b>	Law and Justice	National Education	11.2015 – 12.2017
<b>Elżbieta Rafalska</b>	Law and Justice	Family, Labour and Social Policy	11.2015 – 12.2017
<b>Elżbieta Witek</b>	Law and Justice	Without Portfolio: Chief of the Political Cabinet of the Prime Minister	11.2015 – 12.2017
<b>Beata Kempa</b>	United Poland	Without Portfolio: Chief of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister	11.2015 – 12.2017

Sources: *Law and Justice (2015); Lansford (2019); Polish Government (2022).*

**Table 2: Female Cabinet Members in Hungary 2010 - present**

<i>Cabinet of Victor Orbán V 2022- present</i>			
Politician's Name	Party	Ministerial Portfolio	Term of Office
<b>Judith Varga</b>	Fidesz	Justice	Since 05.2022
<i>Cabinet of Victor Orbán IV 2018 - 2022</i>			
Politician's Name	Party	Ministerial Portfolio	Term of Office
<b>Judit Varga</b>	Independent	Justice	07.2019 – 05.2022
<b>Andrea Bártfai-Mager</b>	Independent	Without Portfolio: Administration of State Assests	05.2018 – 05.2022
<b>Katalin Novák</b>	Fidesz	Without Portfolio: Family and Social Affairs	01.2020 – 05.2022
<i>Cabinet of Victor Orbán II 2010 – 2014</i>			
Politician's Name	Party	Ministerial Portfolio	Term of Office
<b>Zsuzsanna Németh</b>	Independent	National Development	12.2011 – 06.2014

Sources: *Hungarian Government (2014); Hungarian Government (2022)*

**Table 3: Assignment of the ministerial portfolios in Poland 2015 – present**

Ministerial Portfolio	Druckman and Roberts (2017)	Krook and O'Brien (2012)
Development	Infrastructure	Planning & Development
Deputy Prime Minister	Deputy Prime Minister	Government, Interior, Home Affairs
Labour	Labour and Social Policy	Labour
Family and Social Policy	Labour and Social Policy	Children & Family
Funds and Regional Policy	Infrastructure	Regional
Sports	Education and Sports	Sports
Education	Education	Education
Digitalisation	Infrastructure	Planning & Development
Finance	Finance	Finance & Economy
Interior and Administration	Internal Affairs, Interior	Government, Interior, Home Affairs
Without Portfolio: Chief of the Council of Minister	Without Portfolio: Council of Ministers Office	Government, Interior, Home Affairs
Without Portfolio: Chief of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister	Without Portfolio: Council of Ministers Office	Government, Interior, Home Affairs

Ministerial Portfolio	Druckman and Roberts (2017)	Krook and O'Brien (2012)
Without Portfolio: Coordinator for Humanitarian Aid and Refugee Affairs	Without Portfolio: Council of Minister Office	Displaced Persons & Expatriates
Without Portfolio: Chief of the Political Cabinet of the Prime Minister	Without Portfolio: Council of Minister Office	Displaced Persons & Expatriates
Entrepreneurship and Technology	Science and Technology	Science and Technology
Without Portfolio: Member of the Council of Minister	Without Portfolio: Council of Minister Office	Government, Interior, Home Affairs
Climate and Environment	Environmental Protection and Natural Ressources	Environment and Natural Ressources

**Table 4: Assignment of the ministerial portfolios in Hungary 2010 – present**

Ministerial Portfolio	Druckman and Roberts (2017)	Krook and O'Brien (2012)
Justice	Justice	Justice
Without Portfolio: Administration of State Assets	Without Portfolio	Government, Interior, Home Affairs
Without Portfolio: Family and Social Affairs	Without Portfolio	Children & Family

**Table 5: Gender Type of the ministerial portfolios in Hungary 2010 - present**

Gender Type, Ministerial Portfolio	Female	Neutral	Masculine
Without Portfolio: Family and Social Affairs	X		
Justice		X	
National Development		X	
Without Portfolio: Administration of State Assets			X

**Table 6: Gender Type of the ministerial portfolios in Poland 2015 - present**

Gender Type, Ministerial Portfolio	Female	Neutral	Masculine
Family, Labour and Social Policy	X		
Education	X		
Development		X	
Funds and Regional Policy		X	
Without Portfolio: Coordinator for Humanitarian Aid and Refugee Affairs		X	
Digital Affairs		X	
Sports		X	
Without Portfolio: Chief of the Council of Minister			X
Without Portfolio: Chief of the Political Cabinet of the Prime Minister			X
Finance			X
Entrepreneurship and Technology			X

Gender Type, Ministerial Portfolio	Female	Neutral	Masculine
Prime Minister			X
Without Portfolio: Chief of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister			X
Deputy Prime Minister			X
Interior & Administration			X
Climate and Environment		X	