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

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Class-based voting in Paraguay[1]

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Abstract:

The main objective of this paper is to survey whether there is a relationship between social class and choice between political parties in Paraguay and to ascertain if decreasing or increasing significance of class voting has showed. At first, by means of the empirical research, the specific Paraguayan class scheme is established and subsequently particular outputs of class voting are simulated using data from the questionnaire surveys and elementary logit, and multinomial logistic regression methods. The resulting finding is that social class has never significantly affected electoral decisions of Paraguayan voters. This paper also decisively demonstrates a dramatic decrease of class voting significance in Paraguay over the past 20 years. More detailed statistical methods established an apparent tendency of civil servants and employees classes to vote for the dominant ANR party.

Key words: *class voting; social structure; Paraguay; Colorados; Azules*

Introduction

Class-based voting is one of the oldest theories used to define voters' behaviour. However, are class-based values as a cause of electoral behaviour still relevant and up-to-date? Does social stratification significantly affect voters' decisions and what political party they vote for? The endeavour of this paper is to find the interrelation of class affiliation and choice between two dominant parties in Paraguay (ANR, PLRA)[3] and, with a few exceptions, other marginal political subjects. The primary objective is to determine whether class membership affects the electoral behaviour of Paraguayan voters and if there is an apparent tendency within the stratification process and electoral behaviour. The disposition of these objectives and a consecutive research also enables some subsidiary questions to be answered.

Firstly, what is the class structure of voters' for individual parties, or is their electorate grouping a wealthier urban population, poor rural population, or the electorate widely formed across individual social classes? Secondly, are material goods, income, level of education or occupation key factors of the electoral behaviour in Paraguay, or are these factors more likely playing a secondary role? Relating to these questions, this paper will defend the starting assumption that both dominant parties are of multiclass character and their

[1] This paper is a part of the specific research project of the Philosophical faculty of the Hradec Králové University "*Class-based voting in Latin American countries*".

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[3] PLRA = Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico (Authentic Radical Liberal Party), nicknamed after the party's blue colour, Azules. ANR = Asociación Nacional Republicana/Partido Colorado (National Republican Association/ Colorado Party), nicknamed after the party's red colour, Colorados.

respective electorates composed of diverse social classes. It can therefore be presumed that a party identification of Paraguayan voters with two dominant parties where class affiliation does not play an important part is deep rooted.[4] A further research objective will be the measuring of the social stratification corelating with a choice of one of the parties in particular periods. It is an attempt to detect a trend of class-based behaviour in individual years of the sociological research period. What are the reasons for a class-based voting investigation especially in Paraguay?

Paraguay is a very specific country as is has always had a long-term, continuous and stable party system with a relative high party identification.[5] The existence of two traditional parties, which have played a dominant part within the party system for more than 125 years, is a very significant Paraguayan phenomenon. In Paraguay, except for a short period in the 1930s, there were only two parties shifting power from one to the other: a conservative one, Colorados, and liberal one in various historical shapes, eventually in coalition form.[6] ANR, with the strongest party platform in Paraguay (Aquino 2012), is a right-wing conservative and nationalist party laying stress on patron–client relationships and protecting in the long term the interests of big farmers, business communities, military leaders and the clergy (Nohlen 2005: 413–414; Němec et al. 2006: 278–279).

Only once over the past 60 years was someone other than a Colorados candidate elected president.[7] PLRA, on the contrary, tends to be classified as a left-of-centre group, defending instead the interests of the urban classes (Němec et al. 2006: 278–279). These definitions are however quite simplified if not misleading. The programme of Azules is actually very conformable to that of Colorados; both parties should more likely fall under the right-of-centre wing, for a variety of reasons.[8] PLRA is rather a formal political opposition against ANR. Often it concerns a co-opted ally, which together with deputies for Colorados takes a conservative position towards some governmental proposals of the reformist presidents (especially *vis-à-vis* the administration of presidents Lugo and Duarte Frutos). Together with the republicans, the liberals are despite their name a conservative and nationalist party. Both parties defended historically interests of "*heterogenous oligarchic groups*" (Nohlen 2005: 413–414).

The paper itself is structured into several parts. In the first part, the author introduces the existing empirical research of class voting, focusing on Latin American countries. In the second part, individual elements of stratification are discussed on the basis of empirical

[4] Party identification used to be denoted in Paraguay as universal, when membership in one of them becomes a lifelong commitment (Lewis 1980: 145–150). Party membership in Paraguay is thus deep-rooted in the past and a party system remained more or less kept alive. The eventual termination of party membership is considered as a treacherous act against family and friends (Lewis 1980: 145–150).

[5] Other countries with a long continuous party system include Colombia, Honduras and Uruguay (Dix 1989: 25).

[6] Partido Liberal (PL) was established as early as July 1887. Although this original subject ceased to exist, there appeared as a liberal continuity two of its successors – Partido Liberal Radical (PLR) and the current PLRA.

[7] The exceptional case happened in 2008, when APC coalition candidate Fernando Lugo was elected president; he himself was changed for PLRA member Federico Franco after the impeachment in 2012 for the remainder of the electoral period.

[8] The main argument seems to be especially bilateral support of the so-called Chilean economic model during the presidential election in 2013 or an endeavour after bigger private investments in the public sector and its wide-ranging reforms. Both political subjects are thus ideologically close, both comprise several rival fractions and last but not least, both are in the throes of large-scale corruption cases.

findings and simultaneously a specific class scheme of Paraguayan society is proposed becoming thus a key indicator of the class-based voting. In the third part, data and working methods are shown, with an annotation of the data set and their selecting, and an explanation of the methods of measuring correlation and individual formulas. The fourth part includes global results of research of class-based electoral behaviour in Paraguay between 1995 and 2014. According to individual periods of time that enclose or cover the election years, the results of the quantitative research using simple logit methods and multinomial logistic regression methods will be provided. Thus, a tendency of the class voting during last two décennies will be established and analysed.

Empiricism of the class voting

Questionnaire surveys became in the 1940s a basis for class-voting research (Denver 2007: 19). These very data from the sociological researches became an essential instrument for empirical researches and enabled researchers to establish more easily whether there is a relationship between class position and voting behaviour. In the later years of the twentieth century, various research was carried out on the basis of which it was often ascertained that a relationship between class membership and a vote for one of the parties still existed but had become progressively weaker. The fact remains that these researches were carried out especially in developed West European democracies (cf. Sainsbury 1987; Clark et al. 1993; Ringdal and Hines 1995; Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf 1999; Anderson and Heath 2000; Clark 2003). Research on class-based voting in Latin America was different. Due to the fact that the democratisation processes in this region happened as late as at the end of the twentieth century, there was no reason to carry out research on the relationship between class and voting, though several studies appeared. Maurice Zeitlin and James Petras published in 1970 an article on voting behaviour of Chile's working class during 1958 and 1964. Using selected empirical data, they ascertained that the electorate of the communist and socialist parties is composed of the working class; meanwhile, the electorate of Christian Democrats was composed of heterogeneous ranks often with the opposed values and interests (Zeitlin and Petras 1970). Peter Snow in 1979 made a survey of Argentina's situation with results proving that, despite the Peronist party rather being considered as a working-class party, quite often votes for it came from the middle and upper classes, and this party obtained the status of a multiclass party (Snow 1979: 36–39; cf. Jorrat and Acosta 2003). The prevalence of the multiclass parties in Latin America in the 1980s is supported by Robert Dix in the paper "*Cleavages Structures and Party Systems in Latin America*" (Dix 1989). Dix explains this fact by structural circumstances when, unlike in Europe, in Latin America no strong labour movement during the industrialisation was formed, including no mass class-based parties; there were only multiclass political subjects. Besides the aforementioned Peronistas of Argentina, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua for instance seem to be at first sight a class-based party. Dix himself points out that their electorate is wider, contrary to the opinion of some authors based on the original Sandinista Marxist idea. The view of Dix was supported recently by studies confirming a multiclass character of FSLN (cf. Kouba 2006: 165–185).

Unlike in Western Europe and Northern America, where sociological surveys were carried out as early as in the mid-twentieth century, researchers investigating Latin America were for a long time deprived of this empirical tool. Not before the end of the twentieth century did nongovernmental and non-profit organisations begin taking surveys using

questionnaires; these data became the basis for many empirical researches of the present. America's Vanderbilt University started its own surveys (Americas Barometer) in 2004 and presented the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

Mainwaring and Torcal in the late 1990s investigated class voting and compared seven European and seven Latin American countries. The Latin America class voting turned out to be much weaker than that of Europe. The authors justify this fact on the one hand by institutional and on the other hand by structural causes. In the first case, it concerns the existence of presidential systems in Latin America, where multiclass voting alliances must be established for a presidential candidate to be well placed to win. Simultaneously, a long absence of democratic regimes was a hindrance for class voting in Latin America. The democratic regime would allow the forming of social organisations, which would enable mobilising individual social strata. Mainwaring and Torcal see structural causes in line with Dix in the absence of strong labour organisations during industrialisation. These authors add the notion of the consequence of the mobilisation of voters of individual parties and argue that in countries with leaders appealing to voters by means of class watchwords, class voting will probably be noticeable (Mainwaring and Torcal 2004).

An advancement of the quantitative studies based on comprehensive data analyses seems to occur in the twenty-first century. This tendency became evident in surveys of class voting, especially in countries without sufficient data and institutional background for conducting such research. Latin America is living proof of it. Carlos Vilalta in his paper of 2005 examined class voting in Ciudad de México (Vilalta 2005). He established that socio-economic causes were the main reason for class voting by citizens in the capital of Mexico during the election year of 1994 and particularly of 2000. These citizens favoured especially the right-wing Partido Acción Nacional (PAN). Class consciousness was manifested also by voters of the social-democratic Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), originated from the working class. Situated in between was Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI).

Noam Lupu in his paper of 2010 described class-based behaviour in Venezuela during 1993–2006. While in 1998, when Hugo Chávez was elected president for the first time, the expected result really showed significant impact of class membership on electoral behaviour, a unique effect was not ascertained in the next elections, what the author called nonmonotonic class voting.[9] Lupu concludes on the basis of empirical findings that except for in the 1998 elections, Chávez chose more a multiclass appeal and gripped mainly the middle class (Lupu 2010; cf. Arias 2012).

Tomáš Došek devoted himself to class voting in Uruguay and Bolivia. Došek, like many authors, illustrates that causes of electoral behaviour are of a multidimensional character and affected by numerous factors (structural, ideological, of programme, etc.). Došek prefers surveying individual countries of Latin America separately, not the region as a whole. He argues that each country is typical by its specifically structural, institutional and cultural determinants; more likely profiles of presidential candidates are playing a significant role in the electoral decision (Došek 2014). The coalition of left and centre-left parties Frente Amplio (FA) was for the first time elected in Uruguay in 2004. It was definitively ascertained that with growing socioeconomic levels, shares of votes for FA progressively decreased. Results of voting behaviour were similar, as the bourgeois and dominant party gave minimum votes to FA, per contra 50% of informal and formal employees voted for it. Nevertheless,

[9] Monotonic class voting means that there is a higher probability of members of the same social class voting for the same party.

in 2014 the correlation between social class and electoral voting was far lower and instead socioeconomic reasons took the lead (cf. Queirolo 2014).

Mainwaring et al. made in 2015 a cross-national research about class voting in Latin American countries. At first, they compiled a modified class scheme on the basis of the EGP scheme (Mainwaring et al. 2015). But due to the lack of data on the occupation in some years in the Latinobarómetro and AmericasBarometer databases, it is completely inconvenient for making a comparison between years. For that reason, it is necessary to create a relevant scheme, which will reflect major socioeconomic indicators.

Class structure in Paraguay based on the employment sector

The first step in the investigation of class-based electoral behaviour is the choice of an appropriate stratification model. The EGP (Eriksson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero) scheme has become the most influential scheme in the research of class voting. This scheme is based on the occupation level of individuals, and due to many authors is more stable and better suited to understanding the position of an individual within the social structure (Parkin 1971; Rose and Pevalin 2003; Goldthorpe and McKnight, 2006). This scheme and its theoretical approach have become bases for other similar schemes in social sciences, e. g. ESeC, NS-SEC (Conelly et al. 2016: 4).

Another way of measuring social class is the economic level of the individual. This approach has a tradition in the United States (Handlin 2013) and is most often measured either by household wealth or by household income. According to Filmer and Pritchett, the components of household wealth represent the long-term economic status of households, and that eliminating short-term economic outages, such as household income (Filmer and Pritchett 2001; Jenkins and Van Kerm 2009).

But to invent a really effective and relevant class scheme, it is necessary in accordance with a Goldthorpe suggestion (Goldthorpe and Marshall 1992) to analyse first all empirical data. They will serve to understand class structure in Paraguay and in consequence to create a meaningful class scheme as a most effective aid for analysing class voting. Of all questionnaire surveys carried out in Paraguay, we are aware of a position of the respondent in the staff structure, self-identification of the socioeconomic level; further, we have information on goods and services, education, gender, age and ethnic and religion affiliation of the respondent. For 2012 and 2014 (LAPOP), there is information on the income levels of the individuals and the households.

Resulting from the empirical findings based on the information of LAPOP databasis, the highest income in 2014 was attained by civil servants and employees in the public sector. More than 80% of these employees are situated in the two highest income categories. On the other extreme of the class hierarchy are self-employed persons,[10] of whom 65% occupy a position in two low income categories. Most of the civil servants and owners of enterprises can be thus clearly defined as elite members of the upper and upper middle social class. According to further LAPOP data and also to official statistics of DGEEC, these elites live overwhelmingly in municipal areas (DGEEC 2014). On the opposite side are often

[10] Self-employed persons are in this case a category net of owners of enterprises. Mainly, they are employees in the informal economic sector, which is not so strong in Paraguay (Vuletin 2008). These workers represent together with employees in the private sector the largest share of the total number of people in the staffing structure.

self-employed persons, with more than 64% of them earning less than US$ 287 monthly, and the majority living in the countryside. They are mostly members of the lower-middle and lower social class. Between the abovementioned categories are employees in the private sector being mainly representants of the lower-middle and upper-middle class, living in cities. However, the author is aware such approach to class analysis is providing us only with information on what income bracket is most frequently represented and in what employment sector. The abovementioned arguments concerning upper and lower classes cannot be therefore taken as dogma, as in the category of self-employed persons there are more than 16% of those of the highest income category. Self-identification in terms of socioeconomic level[11] can serve as an indicator supporting what is said above. Empirical findings from the Latinobarómetro Database between 1995 and 2013 show that more than 50% of respondents indicated their socioeconomic situation as good or very good. People who indicated their situation as bad or very bad represented the smallest percentage (3–4%) in these categories, which is a substantial difference compared to self-employed persons (16%) and private sector employees (11%).

When empirical data concerning a respondent's occupation are missing, the educational strata used to be an adequate substitute for class categorisation due to a relatively strong correlation between education and class position of a person. Paraguay is specific also in this domain. There is a very distinct educational inequality apparent especially in this country, where the number of adults with an educational attainment on the level of primary school is exceeding three quarters of the rural population.

According to official statistics by DGEEC, more than three-quarters of employees with more than 12 years of achieved education and holding secondary school diplomas or university degrees work in the public sector. It is absolutely the highest share of the educated population in the employment sectors. This share amounts only to 24% in the private sector, and as regards employers and owners of enterprises (i.e. bourgeoisie), only 26% of them achieved a middle or upper level education. At the bottom of the educational strata are employees in the informal sector, dominated by people with an educational attainment on the primary school level; their share amounts to more than 60% (DGEEC 2014). As the highest income is reached by employees in the public sector and on the contrary the lowest income is evident among self-employed persons, educational strata can be considered as a relevant indicator of social class. This assertion can be documented by other empirical findings which establish the fact that the higher the achieved education level, the higher the income category together with a higher average number of owned goods and services

Students belong to a category outside the employment structure. Their class position based on the class status of the head of the family is problematic, and when measuring their social class position the results could be distorted as their motives at elections could be other than those connected with voting behaviour. In consequence, students will be left as a separate and original stratification category. People of retirement age and unemployed persons are another category. These belong also to separate categories due to their specific interests, which are often different from those of students and employed people. A specific class scheme for research on class-based voting in Paraguay is introduced in Tab. 1.

[11] Respondents could select when asked after their own socio-economic situation from the following possibilities: very good, good, average (or not bad), bad, very bad (Latinobarómetro Database 2005–2013).

Tab. 1: Suggested class scheme of Paraguayan society applied to research on voting behaviour

I	Business owners / Partners
II	Salaried employee in a public company
III	Salaried employee in a private company
IV	Self employed / Informal sector
V	Students
VI	Retired
VII	Unemployed

Data and methods

The research on class-based voting behaviour in Paraguay drew upon statistical data of Latinobarómetro (1995–2013) and LAPOP (2006–2014) though the first database and especially a survey in 1995–2014 regionally represented only 46% of the Paraguayan population, hence the results have to be taken with a grain of salt.[12] The years 2005–2013 cover regionally 100% of the population with a 2.8% statistical derogation and 1,200 completed questionnaires were collected during this period. Moreover, the years 1997, 1999, 2000, 2004 and 2008 had to be omitted due to the big difference between missing replies to the request as to political party preference, or more precisely due to the big difference between true results of the election and results from the sociological research carried out in 2008.[13] The LAPOP database already comprises not only more requests but also more respondents. Unfortunately, even this database after the Paraguayan version has not gotten rid of the main deficiencies concerning mainly the establishment of the specific employment position of individual respondents.

Only the questionnaire from 2008 contains these data. Another shortfall is a survey from 2006, where valid responses to requests regarding political preferences are missing. Therefore, just the years 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014 were used, and data on the employment sector of individual respondents were established. The last two years contain responses on individual and household income levels, which will serve as a control variable albeit without the possibility of comparison with sociological surveys of other years.

For research use, it was necessary to unify the index of goods and services (IGS) to make a comparison of individual years. Some surveys comprised namely 14 requests concerning ownership or availability of the goods and services, some 11 requests only. The author decided to unify the maximum value IGS to the number 11 for all surveys.[14] In each

[12] Questionnaire surveys were carried out only in the departments Asunción, Central and Alto Paraná. Taking into account that the regional factor does not affect the voting for dominant parties as much as it affects voting for marginal parties, even these surveys are incorporated into the whole study.

[13] Only 6 people of the total number 712 valid responses would vote ANR in the research of 2008.

[14] Resulting from Latinobarómetro 1995–2010 following goods and services are included: TV set, refrigerator, computer, washing machine, phone, passenger car, weekend house, drinking water, sewerage and own house. For 2011 and 2013, the following items are included: refrigerator, computer, washing machine, phone, mobile phone, passenger car, drinking water, hot water, sewerage, own house and detached rooms of parents and children. IGS is set up according to LAPOP data of 2008–2012 as follows: TV set, refrigerator, mobile phone, phone, computer, microwave, washing machine, passenger car, motorcycle, drinking water and shower. Finally, 2014 data contain following goods and services: TV set, refrigerator, mobile phone, phone, computer, microwave, washing machine, passenger car, drinking water, shower and sewerage.

of the surveyed years, a mean IGS value was calculated per one respondent and based upon either plus status (+) in the case of the above average IGS or minus status (-) in the case of below average IGS, both allocated to each respondent. Subjective income as a further control variable is divided into categories as follows: sufficient with savings, sufficient without savings, insufficient with problems, insufficient with big problems.

Hereinafter, simple models to record the distribution of votes of individual social classes given to both dominant parties and other parties will be presented. The adjusted standardised residuals (ASR) will enable a control of marginal distribution. The residues follow trends of the members of social classes to vote individual parties when marginal distribution influence is controlled. Thus, the statistical significance of the correlation between social class and option for one of the parties can be explained (Matějů and Řeháková 1997: 22). In other words, the adjusted residual indicates a significance of the difference between an empirically measured frequency and an awaited (theoretic) frequency. The higher the absolute value of the measured adjusted residual, the higher the statistical significance of the ascertained relation between social class and voting will be.[15] Besides ASR, a chi square testing will be carried out for each data set and will attest whether there is a detectable, significant relationship between dependent and independent variables. The resulting p-value is often compared with a level 0.05. With a lower resulting value, we can exclude a null hypothesis (in our case, for instance the assertion that there is no relationship between social class and voting behaviour in Paraguay). As far as the resulting value is higher, this null hypothesis cannot be discounted.

Finally, the intensity of the class voting taking into account the control variables will be measured using a model of multinomial logistic regression (kappa index). This index will be based upon odds ratio logarithms. Gross index kappa means in this case a standard deviation of the measured logit values of social classes in individual time periods. Net index kappa is then calculated as a standard deviation of the measured logit values in all observed stratification categories in individual time periods. Ideally, both indices will equate, which would mean that control variables did not affect the main consequences of class voting and that their standard deviation matched. Bigger differences between both indices will represent more or less influence of the control variables than that of class affiliation.

Results and interpretation

Tab. 2 offers an outline of class voting in Paraguay in 1995–2014. The information introduces a proportion of votes between ANR, PLRA and other parties according to social classes and in individual time periods, including the adjusted standardised residues which support a statistical significance of the deviation vis-à-vis the expected frequency. Where more significant deviations occur, very low p-values were measured showing thus a distinctive correlation between voting decision and social class.

[15] Values of adjusted residues higher than 1.96 and lower than -1.96 represent statistically significant deviations.

Tab. 2: Class voting in Paraguay in 1995–2014

1995-1998								
Party	**Social class**							**N**
	I	**II**	**III**	**IV**	**V**	**VI**	**VII**	
COLORADOS	64,00%	73,08%	53,56%	61,83%	37,50%	67,21%	60,26%	699
	1,14	**3,56**	**-2,49**	0,77	**-4,50**	1,16	0,03	
AZULES	15,43%	9,62%	19,85%	24,26%	20,45%	13,11%	16,67%	216
	-1,16	**-3,09**	0,61	**3,19**	0,47	-1,13	-0,45	
OTHERS	20,57%	17,31%	26,59%	13,91%	42,05%	19,67%	23,08%	248
	-0,26	-1,32	**2,39**	**-3,95**	**4,94**	-0,32	0,39	
N	175	156	267	338	88	61	78	1163
Chi square	*61,302 (p < 0,00001, df = 12)*							

2001-2005								
Party	**Social class**							**N**
	I	**II**	**III**	**IV**	**V**	**VI**	**VII**	
COLORADOS	65,41%	71,54%	54,86%	65,74%	55,67%	65,71%	51,28%	780
	0,83	**2,27**	**-2,89**	**2,04**	-1,36	0,64	**-2,03**	
AZULES	21,05%	13,82%	28,13%	25,48%	27,84%	18,57%	41,03%	317
	-1,18	**-3,07**	1,28	0,15	0,61	-1,32	**3,31**	
OTHERS	13,53%	14,63%	17,01%	8,78%	16,49%	15,71%	7,69%	159
	0,32	0,69	**2,53**	**-3,18**	1,18	0,79	-1,36	
N	133	123	288	467	97	70	78	1256
Chi square	*38,613 (p = 0,00012, df = 12)*							

2006-2009								
Party	**Social class**							**N**
	I	**II**	**III**	**IV**	**V**	**VI**	**VII**	
COLORADOS	50,00%	63,12%	50,27%	51,42%	48,31%	54,74%	53,45%	1213
	-0,74	**3,80**	-1,21	-0,90	-0,94	0,44	0,20	
AZULES	23,47%	17,38%	20,22%	23,82%	22,03%	16,84%	16,38%	494
	0,74	-1,76	-0,77	**2,38**	0,17	-1,10	-1,35	
OTHERS	26,53%	19,50%	29,51%	24,76%	29,66%	28,42%	30,17%	602
	0,15	**-2,68**	**2,10**	-1,20	0,91	0,53	1,03	
N	196	282	549	953	118	95	116	2309
Chi square	*24,655 (p = 0,01655, df = 12)*							

2010-2014								
Party	Social class							N
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
COLORADOS	58,16%	67,85%	60,02%	59,60%	58,95%	67,29%	64,16%	2330
	-1,04	**3,25**	-0,71	-1,66	-0,62	1,34	0,98	
AZULES	30,50%	23,38%	30,19%	30,78%	35,26%	23,36%	25,22%	1121
	0,43	**-3,08**	0,58	1,68	1,83	-1,39	-1,42	
OTHERS	11,35%	8,77%	9,79%	9,63%	5,79%	9,35%	10,62%	364
	1,07	-0,62	0,28	0,16	-1,81	-0,07	0,57	
N	282	479	848	1683	190	107	226	3815
Chi square	*22,511 (p = 0,03218, df = 12)*							

Source: *Latinobarómetro 1995–2013; LAPOP 2008–2014; author's Fig. and calculations.*
Note: Column percentage including adjusted standardised residues.

It is quite clear that higher classes of civil servants and employees (II) vote more commonly for the governmental party ANR. As regards this correlation, high adjusted residuals were measured during the whole investigation period. The abovementioned electoral decision can be explained by an effort to maintain the socioeconomic status quo due to the higher social position of civil servants. Such very conservative behaviour could have originated in the past and especially at the time of Stroessner stronism,[16] when each of the officials was under a statutory duty to be a member of the governing party ANR (Němec 2006: 265); that was and still is a way to gain power and to ensure a comfortable living for them and their families. Members of this social class still prefer ANR mainly at the expense of Azules. The number of civil servants' votes cast for Azules in 1995–2014 was less than expected in the independent situation. The declining significance of class voting touched especially students and private sector staff. An evident shift of private sector staff to other parties at the expense of Colorados is recorded during 1995–2009, with high declining residues in this class during 2010–2014. Recently, a slight departure of the owners' class from ANR and more shifting to other parties than accustomed in the past is explicit during the measures of recent years. Marginal parties start in recent years to attract voters from the informal employees class and self-employed persons. While in 1995–2005 these people gave markedly less votes to other parties, in the following decade the difference between the expected and measured frequency was insignificant. The pensioners and unemployed persons are indecisive voters of whatsoever party, and their support is fluctuating. In 1995–2005 class voting thus gained more importance than in 2006–2014. It can in a very simplified fashion be concluded that in the first decade ANR was a party of civil servants and shared with PLRA votes of informal employees and finally the other parties were attractive for students and private employees. In the second decade, a multiclass aspect of dominant parties was more sharply followed, statistically significant deviations remained explicit in the class of civil servants only, and slightly in the informal employees.

Tab. 3 below is showing that income as a core variable in class voting manifests only minimally in both parties. Generally, the adjusted residues are here low and an attained level of p-value is high. It can therefore be concluded that income in 2012 and 2014 did not

[16] Stronismo or stronauto = period of Stroessner dictatorship in 1954–1989.

significantly affect the voting decisions of Paraguayans. The frequency of the respondents selecting other parties is unfortunately low and does not enable their thorough analysis. On the other hand, when assuming certain class behaviour of voters for these marginal parties, the results being composed of only few data and confirming the underlying assumptions, are worth mentioning. The centre-left coalition AP, which comprises voters from prevailing urban strata, takes over the voters from higher income categories when results are considered. Per contra the left CNFG, whose voters belong rather to rural strata, takes over the voters of lower income categories as expected. The right PPQ can be very carefully assessed as a party of wealthier urban strata. But due to minimum data, these are rather assumptions than evidence-based assertions.

Tab. 3: Voting in 2012 and 2014 according to the individual's income

2012-2014					
Party	Income quartile				N
	I	II	III	IV	
COLORADOS	25,52%	25,99%	27,26%	21,24%	631
	1,42	0,01	-0,17	-1,28	
AZULES	20,89%	27,40%	27,74%	23,97%	292
	-1,48	0,65	0,14	0,68	
AP	44,00%	24,00%	20,00%	12,00%	25
	2,37	-0,23	-0,84	-1,28	
CNFG	7,14%	10,71%	35,71%	46,43%	28
	-2,12	-1,87	0,99	**3,06**	
PPQ	50,00%	40,00%	10,00%	0,00%	10
	1,93	1,02	-1,24	-1,72	
UNACE	10,00%	30,00%	35,00%	25,00%	20
	-1,48	0,41	0,77	0,26	
OTHERS	22,22%	16,67%	27,78%	33,33%	18
	-0,18	-0,91	0,03	1,10	
N	246	266	281	231	1024

***Source**: LAPOP 2012–2014; author's Fig. and calculations.*
Note: Fig. comprises row percentage including adjusted standardised residues.

The abovementioned statements on urban and rural voters are supported by Graph 1, showing a regional distribution of these marginal parties' supporters. It is evident that the higher the percentage of urban population in the given department, the higher the percentage for PPQ or AP. The opposite result can be seen as regards CNFG. This left coalition attained better voting results mainly in the rural regions of Paraguay. Neither dominant party showed any regional differences.

Graph 1: Presidential election 2013 – votes for PPQ, AP and CNFG, percentage of urban population in individual departments



***Source**: (DGEEC 2002; TSJE 2013), author's Graph and calculations.*

Finally, Tab. 4 presents a model of multinomial logistic regression connecting logarithms of the odds ratio in individual stratification categories. Based on logit values of particular social classes where business owners and partners (I) represent reference categories, firstly a gross kappa index is calculated. Gross index kappa means in this case a standard deviation of the measured logit values of social classes in individual time periods. This index is then excluding other explanatory variables and a net kappa index is calculated. The categories of control variables are represented by reference groups as follows: people with an incomplete and complete tertiary degree and university degree, people with comfortable income and savings, people with above-average goods and services, people over 60 years of age. Men are considered in the gender category as a reference group. We can see that there was primarily a group of state employees, which showed a relatively strong and constant influence on the class behaviour model during the years. As we can see in this table, apart from the class variable also the education and the subjective income had the greatest impact on this model. Interesting is the increasing impact of the wealth index over the years. By contrast, the variable of gender had almost no effect on this model. In summary, other variables, as with the class one, tend to have a decreasing effect on class voting behaviour in Paraguay.

Tab. 4: Log-odds ratio of the ANR choice in individual stratification categories; net and gross index kappa

Stratification category	1995 - 1998	2001 - 2005	2006 - 2009	2010 - 2014
Business owners / Partners	reference group			
Salaried employee in a public company	0,423	0,285	0,537	0,418
Salaried employee in a private company	-0,433	-0,442	0,011	0,077
Self employed / Informal sector	-0,093	0,014	0,057	0,059
Students	-1,086	-0,409	-0,068	0,033
Retired	0,142	0,013	0,190	0,392
Unemployed	-0,159	-0,586	0,138	0,253
N	**1 163**	**1 256**	**2 309**	**3 815**
Incomplete and complete terciary education and university degree	reference group			
Incomplete and complete secondary education	0,184	0,143	-0,065	0,213
Without education, incomplete and complete primary education	0,512	0,280	0,202	0,066
N	**1 111**	**1 268**	**2 412**	**4 157**
Subjective income: sufficient with savings	reference group			
Subjective income: sufficient without problems	0,287	-0,523	0,043	0,090
Subjective income: insufficient with problems	0,186	-0,498	-0,234	-0,117
Subjective income: insufficient with big problems	0,053	-0,110	-0,233	-0,219
N	**1 178**	**1 266**	**2 478**	**4 329**
Goods and services index (+)	reference group			
Goods and services index (-)	0,037	0,155	-0,084	-0,226
N	**1 195**	**1 268**	**2 489**	**4 380**
Age 60 years +	reference group			
Age 41-60 years	0,002	0,061	-0,106	0,127
Age 26-40 years	-0,156	-0,256	-0,095	-0,025
Age 16-25 years	-0,787	-0,286	-0,175	0,027
N	**1 194**	**1 268**	**2 489**	**4 376**
Gender (male)	reference group			
Gender (female)	-0,110	0,232	0,090	0,034
N	**1 195**	**1 268**	**2 489**	**4 380**
gross kappa index	**0,521**	**0,340**	**0,213**	**0,173**
net kappa index	**0,417**	**0,307**	**0,195**	**0,183**

***Source**: Latinobarómetro 1995–2013; LAPOP 2008–2014; author´s Fig. and calculations*

Graph 2: Graph of net and gross index kappa



***Source**: Latinobarómetro 1995–2013; LAPOP 2008–2014, author's Graph and calculations.*

Graph 2 illustrates a decline of the significance of class voting in Paraguay, namely in 1995–2009. In the ensuing period, the decline was not so pronounced, though index kappa (gross and net) did not reach a value of 0.2 when a significant effect of the social class on voting decision of Paraguayans can in no case be considered. It is worth noting the declining significance of the control variables towards the net effect of class voting. In other words, the other stratification categories were in 1995–2009 less significant factors for voting decision than a pure class affiliation. After adjustment, this period is marked by significant deviations between net and gross index. What is more important is that much like class affiliation also other control variables are showing a declining tendency of the impact on Paraguayans' voting decisions.

Conclusion

This paper set a goal to map out class voting in Paraguay and record any relevant declining or increasing significance of such behaviour. However, a primary issue anticipated such aims and objectives. Is it worth speaking in the case of Paraguay of the existence itself of class voting, at all? Is this causality so insignificant that class does not play any part in voting behaviour in Paraguay? Together with this major issue, the theses on the insignificant role of social class were submitted when social class is considered as a determining factor within the frame of voting decision between both dominant parties. Other marginal parties were on the contrary considered as more class-oriented than Colorados and Azules. The submitted paper outlined that inside the electorate of both dominant parties there are some social groups represented beyond expectation and others again under-represented. To measure class voting, it was necessary to start all over again.

Firstly, the existing Paraguayan social structure and its individual components were analysed on the well-founded empirical basis of the sociological research and official statistics. Due to limited information of the questionnaire surveys of Latinobarómetro and LAPOP, there was a need to create a specific class scheme with its own logic structure derived from a genuine social structure. The suggested class scheme became a basis for ensuing testing of appropriate models of class voting. Finally, several methods were chosen right away. First of all, distribution of votes between Colorados, Azules and other parties in 1995–2014 was submitted using simple classifications, along with a statistical model of adjusted standardised residues that enabled following the statistical significance of the correlation between social class and option for one of the parties. It concerned the observed periods of 1995–1998, 2001–2005, 2006–2009, and 2010–2014. In this way, for each period significant residues of civil servants and employees social classes were measured as well as their tending towards the dominant Colorados at the expense of Azules. In the past, self-employed persons inclined more towards Azules (these people should in the case of Paraguay be included more appropriately as employees in the informal sector). Employees of the private sector were tending rather towards other marginal parties. These results convincingly demonstrated a decline of significance of class voting since 1995. The odds ratio of individual social classes by means of logit methods were consequently introduced in various time periods. This model became proof of class voting decline in Paraguay in 1995–2014 when especially in the early years the significant differences of the odds ratio between individual social classes were observed whilst recently only marginal differences were perceptible, and all the social classes distributed their votes nearly evenly.

Tab. 3 with votes distribution to relevant parties according to income in 2012–2014 became another model. Whilst there was not any big difference between the dominant parties, more distinctive class behaviour could be observed as regards marginal parties (mainly AP, CNFG and PPQ). It matches up with the linear model of votes distribution for both parties in individual departments, the results of which are logically complementing the previous. The left CNFG receives votes mainly from people in rural areas, with low income and low goods and services. Opposite facts were established regarding the centre-left AP and right-wing PPQ. The electorate of these two parties is on the contrary composed of urban strata with higher income and higher goods and services. Moreover, the similar share of voters of both dominant parties was found in all income quartiles, as well as in the regional votes distribution. So, there cannot be applied a thesis that PLRA voters are mainly composed of urban strata. Both PLRA and ANR occupy a similar regional distribution. As the empiric survey data are limited, only some variables could be included in the resulting curve of class voting. Social class belongs to the core variable; education, subjective income, index of goods and services, age and gender are control variables. The resulting index kappa net of the abovementioned control variables evidenced a downward trend in class voting in Paraguay in 1995–2014.

Research of class voting in Paraguay has so far not been so extensive as are indications of the increasing interest in this domain. It could be caused by generally declining interest in the research based on class values and an increasing number of studies using many determinative factors of voting behaviour. However, the Paraguayan results demonstrate the truth of these new trends. In this landlocked country a social class is of marginal importance within the frame of voting, perhaps with the exception of the civil servants class, who vote mainly ANR, no other class can be considered as a conscious one. The behaviour of civil servants as suggested in the analytical part of the paper is theoretically explainable

by their long-term effort to maintain the socioeconomic status quo. In the case of ANR and PLRA, both are still considered as multiclass parties with a large electorate and they appeal in any elections to the widest population strata. Anyone who in future pursues research of the voting decisions of Paraguayans probably will employ the older papers of Robert Dix, who asserted in 1989 that Paraguayans retained a deeply rooted party identification. Vote decision is handed down from generation to generation, and a social class does not play any significant role, a fact which has been demonstrated in this paper, as well.

If we compare the results with other class voting research, the weaker effect of class voting on the presidential election was also measured by Mainwaring et al. 2015. The exception was only the year 2008, when Fernando Lugo won. According to the authors, the mobilisation of left-wing voters through social themes can increase the effect of class voting on presidential elections (Mainwaring et al. 2015).

The absence of the developed class-based voting in Paraguay raises several questions. Will eventual poverty reduction and raising of levels of education in the future affect the downward trend in the class voting? Will rural communities of poor peasants be aware of their social status and start promoting their own interests through class-based parties such as CNFG in particular, headed by popular theologist of liberation and ex-president Fernardo Lugo? Will there be considered the eventuality of profiling actual dominant multiclass parties to more class-based ones? It is not likely to happen. For the time being, there is no indication of a changing situation in subsequent years. Henceforth, Colorados and Azules will play first fiddle with a multiclass basis and will more resolve factional conflicts than compete against each other. Within both political parties a conservative ethos still dominates, and occasional efforts of other political actors are constantly frozen by deputies belonging to ANR and PLRA.

A major issue concerning class voting remains whether the submitted class scheme using rather occupational sectors than specific employment positions is suitable for research itself. When more detailed data are lacking, a reality distortion has to be considered together with the informative capability of the submitted class scheme. On the other hand, the issues resulting from a more detailed EGP scheme as well as the scheme suggested by the author did not establish a significant correlation between class and voting in Paraguay. Probably there would be anyhow established a downward trend in class voting even when relevant data would be available and the Goldthorpe scheme was applied. Future research should make use of others than class-based values when analysing and explanating the voting decision. As it seems, the class-based values in Paraguay are not for class voting significant.

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