Power, Justice, and National Culture in an Expanding European Union: An Unjust Dilemma for Potential Member States[1]

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Abstract:

The ever-expanding European Union (EU) presents the potential member states (PMs) with a difficult choice: adopt its values to join the EU or miss out on the benefits that come with the membership. From the perspective of the EU, a state's decision to join depends on the democratic and voluntary will of its people. However, from the perspective of potential member states, the EU's "take-it-or-leave-it" attitude might be seen as the root of an unjust dilemma. On the one hand, joining the EU promotes increased wealth and redistribution, particularly in the case of less-developed eastern states. On the other hand, joining demands the future member states to sacrifice certain aspects of their culture. This dilemma largely rests on the EU's unwillingness to fairly negotiate with PMs. In practice, member states must often weigh socio-economic benefits against the loss of the state's national culture(s). While Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland are strong enough economically to avoid this dilemma, less powerful PMs face a tougher choice. This paper primarily aims to explain the nature and extent of the dilemma within Europe. This is followed by a discussion of three normative positions one can take on the matter, namely accept, compensate for, or minimize the dilemma. It is suggested that while the EU enlargement has so far largely combined the first two approaches, there may be benefits to minimizing the dilemma.

Key words: *European Union, enlargement, nationalism, social justice, culture, economy*

Introduction

Rapid European Union (EU) enlargement over the last twenty years, along with flickering talks with traditional holdouts like Switzerland and Iceland, makes its grip over the entire continent seem all but certain. From the EU perspective, expanding membership is seen as natural and morally just – enlarging a club to which any reasonable state and its citizens would wish to belong.[3] Yet, despite the fact that potential future member states (PMs) join the EU by engaging in so-called "accession negotiations", the process ensures it is the PMs that harmonize their laws with the *acquis communautaire* (the EU's already agreed upon legal structure) making it largely a one-sided process. The term negotiations, which implies compromise and mutual adjustment, is therefore misleading "as in every case of enlargement to date, accession negotiations conclude successfully because no candidate government has ever been prepared to jeopardize the goal of accession for the sake of

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[3] Perhaps not since the 19th century, when American leaders began promoting the ideology of "manifest destiny" – a vision of spreading American values of freedom and democracy throughout the Americas and eventually the world – has such a singular power engulfed a continent [see Horsman 1981; Miller 2006].

technical details" [Verney 2006: 28]. It would seem that the only carrot the EU needs to use is membership itself. In return, PMs will presumably see their standard of living rise. Recently, the World Bank described the EU as a "*convergence machine*" based on successive enlargements leading to significant upward convergence in wealth between poorer and richer member states [Gill, Raiser 2012]. We should therefore not be surprised that EU membership remains attractive to nearly all non-EU states within Europe.

It is difficult to deny that EU enlargement promises benefits for everyone involved – most notably economic benefits but also political and social benefits. This conception nevertheless masks an *unjust dilemma* imposed by the EU on PMs. The EU's take-it-or-leave-it approach unnecessarily burdens PMs with accepting either the costs of being an outsider, or the costs of modifying their norms and values to comply with the EU. Of course, such external pressure is not regretful in all cases such as when minorities are being mistreated. However, PMs are also unfairly asked to sacrifice certain aspects of their constituent national culture(s) – often linked to economic difference – to achieve economic growth only possible within the EU. Unsurprisingly, the PMs that are the least interested in EU membership already enjoy high levels of economic prosperity. Rune Bjåstad, Norwegian Minister of Culture and Communication, recently said that "*membership was a threat to the sovereignty of Norway, the fishing industries and agriculture would suffer, that membership would result in increased centralization, and there would be less favorable conditions for equality and the welfare state*" [*EuroNews* 2013]. For economically better-off PMs like Iceland, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Norway, the dilemma is less pronounced. These countries denounce EU membership not simply on the grounds that it would prove financially problematic but that their unique way of life would be compromised.[4] Yet, the dilemma exists even in these cases, with the EU's intolerance of differences and unwillingness to compromise playing a key role in keeping them out.

The criticism strikes at the very heart of the EU and its purpose. Though my primary aim is to describe the dilemma and its implications for EU enlargement, it is difficult to do so without discussing contemporary normative debates on the subject. A moral perspective is accordingly adopted throughout. For instance, it should be made clear that I reject the view that EU enlargement should simply solve political problems for the EU, PMs, or both [see Sjursen 2006]. The simple fact that I suggest such a dilemma exists, shows support for the idea that stronger moral linkages exist between the EU and PMs. The moral perspective simply cannot be avoided, even if one believes moral obligations do no exist between EU member states and potential member states.

The paper has the following structure. The first section discuses the dilemma, paying particular attention to its varied impact on richer and poorer PMs. The second section outlines three normative responses: accept, compensate for, or minimize the dilemma. Each position is considered using relevant normative debates on power, justice, and (national or state) culture to suggest that the dilemma is not an unavoidable fact, but a serious problem that the EU should address. The conclusion briefly considers the ways through which the EU could improve its treatment of PMs, also shedding light on possible ways of encouraging greater stability among existing member states.

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[4] It is important to note that PMs, and the EU, are not homogenous entities, with differing internal perspectives on economic and cultural matters. Different organizations, political parties, and individuals may identify more or less strongly with the EU's cultural and economic paradigms and how their own values may or may not easily find a home within the EU. These debates continually play out within PMs where you might find, for instance, rural fishing communities lobbying against political parties that want to have greater access to global markets for the full range of commodities.

On The Dilemma of Joining the European Union

Justly or not, the EU presents PMs with a dilemma by stifling sincere accession negotiations and showing minimal regard for the full extent of PMs' differences. Several assumptions help focus the discussion. First, the World Bank study on upward convergence within the EU is taken to be correct. From a purely developmental point of view, EU enlargement is assumed to generate significant financial gains for everyone involved. This effect may be less pronounced for states like Norway, though there is no reason to believe that deeper integration would not have a positive impact on economic growth strictly understood even for them. Second, the EU's reluctance to negotiate fixes their position on enlargement. Though formally accession negotiations do occur, there is little indication that the EU position changes significantly in the process. This leads to another limit of the discussion that follows. Though it could be argued that PMs can exert their influence from within once they have joined the EU, this dimension is not studied. On the surface, this seems like a serious oversight given its potential to resolve some of the issues raised here. This possibility seems minimal, however, given the force with which transformation occurs within PMs to comply with the *acquis communautaire* and the overall greater power held by more senior member states. Finally, issues are considered primarily from the perspective of PMs. While I suspect the following insights shed light on possible challenges on both sides of the enlargement process, the point of view of states considering joining the EU takes centre stage.[5] These assumptions make it much easier to conceptualize the dilemma facing PMs.

A dilemma is most commonly understood to exist when an actor has to make a difficult decision among a series of options where the best course of action is unclear because all options have serious downsides. Given the EU's steadfast position, PMs really have only two options: comply with the *acquis communautaire* or remain outside the EU. Richer PMs traditionally choose the latter, while central and eastern European states have pursued the former. They arrive at different approaches by weighing each option's pros and cons. No matter which choice PMs make, there is a significant cost that must be brought to the fore. This section highlights the costs on both sides of the debate (the benefits of one being the costs of the other) to reinforce the idea that this poses an unacceptable and avoidable dilemma, which will be discussed in detail in the following section. The key point made in this section is that PMs often have to choose between economic growth and cultural preservation.[6]

The Economic Cost of Remaining Outside the EU

Van Parijs [2012] rightly commends the EU for promoting measures that bring greater wealth to its poorer member states – something eastern PMs in particular would forego should they refuse to join. The first is boosting the GDP of poorer member states through initiatives such as greater foreign direct investment and structural development funds. The second comes from the benefits to individuals, and indirectly their member states, from

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[5] The legacy of having the dilemma in place as the EU grew may help explain many problems within the EU today depending on how much EU-driven reforms have clashed with and disrupted the norms and values held by more recent and even more senior member states (think of the United Kingdom) prior to joining. It could even help explain various challenges within the EU, such as the relationship between the various welfare state models, the euro crisis, or the lack of solidarity within the EU.

[6] Later on, I do briefly discuss the very real possibility that, for some states, the latter factor may indeed be minor or non-existent if they already align with the EU culturally or wish to do so in the future.

citizens moving to richer states to improve their quality of life and sometimes using this to financially support family and friends left behind. Van Parijs [2012: 14] echoes the World Bank report when he concludes that "*as a result of all this, income inequality between member states is arguably a lot lower than it would otherwise have been.*"

For already-wealthy PMs, the story is not quite as clear. Though upward convergence suggests that even they would experience some economic benefit from EU membership, there are some who are concerned that under certain conditions downward convergence could occur. Downward convergence still means that poorer states benefit, but that it is happening at the same time as richer states are falling back. The most common example of this is known as "social dumping" whereby one jurisdiction sends its citizens to another to receive costly services. In the EU, this could cripple robust welfare states in places like Germany, France, and Scandinavia. Speaking to this topic, Vandenbroucke [2012: 8] worries that "in a situation of long-term and widespread unemployment, downward pressure may gain the upper hand." He still concludes that the risk is exaggerated though it warrants attention. The fear of this occurring might explain the lack of interest in the EU on the part of richer PMs, who feel being outside better preserves their economic and cultural distinctiveness.

The Cultural Cost of Joining the EU

The cost most PMs associate with *joining* the EU is a close cousin of why wealthier PMs avoid membership. Of course, poorer PMs do not have robust welfare states that require protecting. Quite the opposite is true in fact. My more novel claim is that even poorer states face an oft-ignored or under-studied cost of joining the EU; more specifically, the economic reforms necessary to meet the *acquis communautaire* can easily strain against the national cultures and identities of PMs. Remembering the words of Bjåstad on his native Norway, joining the EU not only threatens the welfare state, but the way of life for those reliant on fishing and agriculture. Put differently, culture, identity, and economics inseparably go hand-in-hand.

No one, to my knowledge, makes this connection clearer than Fraser. She believes that culture and economy cannot be separated ontologically. Though we might speak of economic equality (redistribution) and cultural equality (recognition), the two interpenetrate each other making it important to view all policies with both lenses at all times. "*The economy is not a culture-free zone, but a culture-instrumentalizing and culture-signifying one. Thus what presents itself as 'the economy' is always already permeated with interpenetrations and norms*" [Fraser 1998: 41]. When Norwegians talk about protecting Norway's welfare state, fishing, and agriculture, they are not simply making an economic claim, but also a claim about what it means to be Norwegian. Similar arguments could be made in poorer states, though they understandably tend to lose out to the much larger economic imperative. But the fact that when poorer PMs join against their cultural interests, as tied to their pre-accession economic way of life, might go a long way to explain the challenges with achieving EU stability and solidarity in general. After all, the financial crisis between northern and southern Europe is not simply about affordability of existing systems, but maintaining welfare systems that have different cultural priorities. In northern member states, more money is spent on health and education, while in the south pensions and earlier retirement is culturally important – a lifestyle that seems to have been more easily maintained and enjoyed prior to joining the EU.

It is important to state that the dilemma need not be great in every case. The more PMs share or want to become part of the EU's cultural-economic worldview, the smaller the dilemma. The overall cost of the dilemma is also smaller for richer PMs who can simply walk away, though it still keeps them outside the EU and therefore ensures both sides miss out on the mutual benefits that come from enlargement. No matter its magnitude, resolving the dilemma is in the interest of all parties. The EU's rapid and arguably hegemonic expansion has attempted to create a homogenous economic zone with significant challenges that stem at least partially, if not largely, from inadequately considering the cultural dimension. It has also been shown that similar cultural intolerance might explain the lack of interest on the part of richer PMs in joining the EU, even if the fear stems more from economic than cultural risks. Given such a dilemma, what should EU enlargement look like? Is it acceptable or should something be done about it? The next section sheds some light on these fundamentally normative questions.

Three General Approaches to the Dilemma of European Enlargement

Various normative positions can be taken on the dilemma. This section provides an overview of arguments supporting three positions: accept, compensate for, and minimize the dilemma. It is of course important to understand that these are analytical categories, with reality often reflecting a combination of the three even if one predominates. Each position is considered using the lenses of power, justice, and culture. It is also useful to mention at the outset that they are ordered from the least to the most active on addressing the dilemma.

Accept the Dilemma

The most straightforward option is to accept the dilemma. This could be supported by several arguments about power, justice, and culture. Starting with power, one might suggest regional (and global) security and economic stability imperatives demand EU enlargement and dwarf concerns raised by the dilemma. Under this approach, the EU acts primarily as what Sjursen [2006: 10] calls a problem-solving entity, whereby it "*would prioritize enlargement to states where the benefits to the existing member states were considered particularly high. This would suggest that the EU is chiefly a problem-solving entity whose principal purpose is to promote the material interests of the (existing) member states.*" Under this approach, the EU might promote enlargement primarily by using so-called "hard power" – a term that infers that the more powerful actor uses military persuasion and economic sanctions to ensure compliance from weaker actors. The dilemma is simply marginalized or ignored entirely because of other factors that are seen as more pressing. Examples include: security [Hill, Smith 2000; Sjurnsen 2004]; economic growth [Haas 1958]; pooling resources to fight against globalization [Warleigh-Lack, Robinson, Rosamond 2007]; or collective action to tackle global issues such as health or the environment [Hocking 2006].[7]

Many prominent theories of justice are compatible with the above account. Miller [1995; 2007] and Rawls [1999] propose that two sets of justice obligations exist: strong obligations between citizens of the same state and weaker humanitarian forms between all hu-

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[7] In practice, the EU prefers not to use "hard power", as shown in one empirical study done a year after the ten eastern and central European states joined the EU in 2004 [Hughes, Sasse, Gordon 2005].

mans as such. This dualist conception of justice is defended primarily on practical grounds. Extensive forms of obligation only arise when people engage in intensive social interaction of the kind found almost exclusively within states. Nagel, for instance, argues that justice only arises when a society establishes shared norms backed by coercion and that this only exists within states [Nagel 2005]. Such theories also point out that the ties needed for social justice do not exist in international or European law. Sangiovanni [2013: 7] states that:

> "statists of this kind need not be euro-skeptics; their position only commits them to the thought that cooperation among EU member states raises no distinctive issues of justice. As long as the EU does not undermine the capacity of states to secure domestic commitments to solidaristic redistribution, then the EU is, as it were, justice-neutral."

Theorists use such arguments to suggest that, basic human rights notwithstanding, the EU does not raise any serious questions of justice. This includes addressing the dilemma, which would only enter into the political calculus of problem solving as seen from the perspective of both EU states and PMs. However, given the power imbalance between the two, this inevitably ensures that the EU maintains its dominance, and that the dilemma remains largely intact.

Two very different lines of cultural arguments promote a hands-off approach to the dilemma. One line downplays or rejects outright the idea that PMs should view adopting EU norms and values as a cost. Supporters of this line feel that EU values are what any reasonable individual or state would come to defend. However, depending on their views of power and justice, supporters of this argument can either deliberately exacerbate the dilemma or ignore it altogether. Those who wish to emphasize the dilemma typically believe that European values and norms must be brought to the rest of Europe or even the world. This is because they do not see it as a dilemma at all, but as positive pressure to expand universal moral values of freedom, democracy, and liberal markets.

The second line comes at the cultural dimension from the other side, suggesting that the dilemma is an unavoidable by-product of respecting each state's right to self-determination. For instance, Rawls' *Law of Peoples* [1999] has been criticized for taking a hands-off approach to many cultural questions, even allowing room for "decent" non-liberal societies. Miller [1995; 2007] also tends to support such a view, though he denies charges that he is moral relativist who believes that moral questions are purely an internal societal matter [see Miller 2002]. These approaches respectively adopt an imperialist or neutral stance toward the cultural dimension presented by the dilemma, differing starkly on the extent to which power should influence other cultures to adopt a universal perspective. Yet, given the power asymmetry between the EU and most PMs, even a so-called neutral approach might be little different in practice as it allows the EU free reign within Europe.

Compensate for the Downside of Joining the EU

Another approach is to compensate for the downsides of joining the EU. What is critical to this stance is the view that the EU still does not withdraw its demand that PMs adopt its norms and values, leaving the *acquis communautaire* untouched. Whether out of necessity

or a sense of moral obligation, the EU provides counterbalancing incentives for PMs to join. The range of possible incentives is limitless, though financial incentives often immediately come to the fore. For example, from 2004 to 2006 over €40.8 billion in assistance went to the ten new member states in Central and Eastern Europe [Hughes, Sasse, Gordon 2005: 5]. Other incentives are certainly possible such as increased power to determine future membership, solving joint problems, accessing affordable education abroad, and so on. Considering only the power dimension, such incentives might only go as far as needed to convince PMs to join. For poorer PMs less has to be done than for richer PMs. In fact, one might say that this approach makes it difficult to truly capture the entire continent because the EU does not feel it can make the compromises or exemptions needed to attract greater interest in membership from wealthier PMs. It seems the EU is more willing to provide financial incentives and remains unwilling to budge on most other matters based on the principle of preserving the EU as it stands. So, although the EU remains committed to seeking reasonable compromises that benefit all parties involved, they still draw deep lines in the sand.

Various justice-based arguments support compensation (i.e., based on duty or obligation) not only when states join the EU ("weaker claim"), but also between states generally ("stronger claim"). Sangiovanni [2013] supports the weaker claim with his theory of "reciprocity-based internationalism", which suggests that social justice exists between EU member states though in a thinner form than within states. He distinguishes between the two empirically by suggesting that "*demands for social solidarity (i.e., justice) at all levels of governance can be understood as demands for a fair return in the mutual production of important collective goods*" [Sangiovanni 2013: 5]. The obligations of social justice are stronger within states because more collective goods are produced at that level. His central claim regarding the EU is that it is:

> "... *a way for member states to enhance their problem-solving capacities in an era of globalization,* while indemnifying each other against the risks and losses implicit in integration. *The EU is a project for and on behalf of its member states achieved, in part, by a transnational extension of its public and social spaces to all European citizens*" [Sangiovanni 2013: 6, emphasis added].

The emphasis differentiates Sangiovanni's theory from that found in the previous section, going beyond a purely realist approach to problem solving. Yet, his theory still seems to consider what each state can contribute to the production of shared goods. Though the EU creates a net, and mutual, benefit in many areas of collective good production, fairly distributing the costs and benefits still largely leaves the power imbalance untouched.

To show this, it is important to consider how his theory answers the following questions: What benefits and costs fall under such a view of social justice? How are they fairly distributed given that each member state might experience costs and benefits of integration differently? In response to the first question, Sangiovanni only considers quantifiable financial costs associated with aspects of the economy and welfare state. His response to the second question involves employing a "thin" Rawlsian veil of ignorance whereby member states would hypothetically contribute to a tax-funded insurance scheme where they would be asked how much they would be willing to pay to offset the risks, assuming they have full

information about the risks but no idea where they place on the distribution (i.e., whether they would be a rich state or not). This would lead to a fairer, more solidaristic way of pooling resources to deal with problems arising from integration. Sangiovanni's theory appears to only make member states whole for any risks incurred through integration. It does not propose greater power symmetry among EU member states but simply assistance for costs associated with integration. Moreover, it is unclear whether benefits or opportunities (i.e., positive risks) will be shared in a similar way. It therefore leaves the pre-integration power imbalance between states largely untouched, even if it slows or stops its exacerbation. It is also unclear what collective goods fall under such a scheme. Aspects of the dilemma certainly would largely fall outside his economic focus.

Tan [2004] supports the stronger obligation claim, bringing the liberal nationalist idea of cultural support to the global level.[8] Fundamentally, Tan argues that for liberals like Rawls and Miller, to remain consistent, they cannot morally erect walls between individuals based on nationality, citizenship, or other historically contingent factors. Quite the opposite, he believes that instead of tolerating 'decent' nonliberal societies, liberals must prioritize consistency over such tolerance when the two conflict. For Tan [2004: 11], cosmopolitan consistency "*takes the ideal of equal concern for persons to entail a commitment to some form of global distributive equality (that aims) to regulate inequalities between persons, even above the threshold of minimal adequacy, against some distributive principle.*" But he is more 'moderate' than radical cosmopolitans in that he believes helping individuals requires acceptance of some moral weight for the existence of nations and states. In putting forth this view, economic redistribution between states is necessary to eliminate power imbalances that allow some states and their national communities to control markets and therefore unjustly exert power over others. Tan ultimately believes that liberals must encourage redistribution between national communities as communities in such cases. Liberal nationalists should therefore not only have something to say about what they should tolerate within states, but also externally *among* states in not only (negatively) respecting but also (positively) supporting the self-determination of other national communities. "*If liberal nationalists take the idea of self-determination seriously as a universal ideal, they must also be committed international egalitarians. The goal of self-determination can be achieved only in a context of, among other things, economic equality between nations. Meeting a predetermined basic needs level may not be enough to secure self-determination, given the fact of competitive interactions among nations.*" [Tan 2004: 121]

Tan's theory nevertheless still only addresses some of the compensatory challenges remaining in Sangiovanni's account. Though he goes a long way in addressing the power imbalances between states, going well beyond simply promoting justice only when collective goods are involved, Tan still maintains a fundamentally economic focus. Taken to its limit, Tan's theory might financially compensate enough to indirectly allow PMs the power to respond to integration while shielding themselves with their newfound economic power. Yet, it still leaves the question of what economic paradigm to adopt as part of EU integration untouched, which of course might still mean PMs would have surrendered part of their culture and accept the dilemma's force, at least partially. This is primarily because it still says nothing about officially and directly recognizing and addressing the cultural dimension of economic integration that respects greater diversity, still promoting the current EU vision, values, and norms above those found within PMs.

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[8] Others propose global sharing of wealth without adopting the cultural lens. See, for instance, Pogge [2008].

Minimize the Dilemma

Sangiovanni's reciprocity-based internationalism primarily seeks to ensure fair allocation of the collective benefits and burdens of member state integration, and Tan's cosmopolitan liberalism calls for greater sharing of global wealth to ensure all states (and nations) can fairly choose whether to join the EU or not. These approaches, at best, tackle the dilemma indirectly; though Tan's approach seems to minimize the dilemma, in the end it would be for naught if PMs must assimilate to the EU's economic paradigm. In other words, his approach arguably still accepts the cultural-economic homogenizing function of the EU. So what does it really mean to minimize, instead of compensate (even generously) for, the dilemma?

In practical terms, the EU would need to tackle enlargement in a more culturally sensitive way, considering to what extent certain exceptions, economic and otherwise, should be granted for cultural reasons. Accession would therefore need to involve sincere negotiations whereby power imbalances are either eliminated (e.g., Tan) or set aside to develop relations based on mutual recognition that promote greater equality, respect, and trust between member states. EU integration has so far neglected such an approach, expanding rapidly without much of a cultural lens or sensitivity to power imbalances. Doing so may slow down the process, and raise other practical problems. However, it would help ensure that there is a greater sense of solidarity and belonging within the EU when negotiations conclude. This is not to deny the very real risk that weaker states might frame all grievances in the language of culture, leading to all forms of economic protectionism. It is nevertheless important to evaluate each claim by allowing for both economic and cultural criteria that might justify special treatment.

Defining specific criteria represents a considerable challenge that goes beyond what can be discussed here. What is important for now is the idea that such criteria are necessary. The idea need not be overcomplicated either. Of course, exceptions cannot be made for everything, but it seems perfectly reasonable, for example, to grant Norway exclusive rights to some form of protectionism or exemption when it comes to the uniqueness of their agriculture and fishing industries if it means they will agree to many other aspects of the *acquis communautaire*. This is even more important if it can be proven that Norwegian membership in the EU under such terms would bring tremendous mutual benefits. Similarly, respecting important cultural industries that the people wish to preserve in eastern PMs would go a long way to building long-term trust between the EU and new and potential members, ideally helping them compete in global markets on their own terms, while at the same time maintaining time-honoured traditional activities. It might be countered that the EU would no longer have consistent norms and values, yet it seems that many of the problems in the EU today – most widely-known of which are the euro and national debt crises – result from failed or partial homogenizing attempts rather than accommodating or recognizing member state differences. Moreover, recognizing the full extent of cultural diversity is itself a possible unifying value.

If deciding whether to join the EU was simply about redistribution, and assuming all states acted in their self-interest, eastern PMs would join the EU without hesitation and wealthier PMs would only wonder whether the convergence was upward instead of downward.[9] As already shown, this poorly explains the reluctance of wealthier PMs that avoid

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[9] Practically speaking, wealthier PMs may still join if there is an acceptable level of downward convergence assuming they give moral weight to joining. On the other side, they may still reject membership to preserve an internal form of redistribution (i.e., sovereignty over the welfare state) over such wider assistance.

joining the EU. Framing the question in the language of social justice, Fraser makes the novel claim that social justice is not simply about redistribution, but also about recognition. Both must be sufficiently considered and adopted to minimize the burden of any given political arrangement on national groups. Though her work focuses on issues of sexuality and gender, it equally applies to the national cultures found within PMs. "*Practically, the task is to devise a programmatic political orientation that integrates the best of the politics of redistribution with the best of the politics of recognition*" [Fraser 1998: 5]. The implications of Fraser's theory are significant in the case of the EU. While the EU does less to interfere in the social, political, and cultural lives of its members, it is naïve to pretend that economics – the main focus of the EU – does not impact all aspects of the lives of member state citizens.

Tackling the dilemma head on purposefully blurs the relationship between power, justice, and culture to the point that establishing criteria for determining how best to balance the three in reducing the dilemma becomes difficult. Normatively, the EU's power needs to be tamed. At the same time, PMs must be prevented from taking advantage of the EU's more generous position. Practically, a scheme of cultural justifications for economic diversity would need to be developed that does not threaten the EU's existence. Such an approach need not entail instability or disharmony within the EU. It simply proposes greater balance and cultural consideration in the enlargement process. Instead, the EU has to consider self-determination claims from PMs, based not on a desire to preserve their culture but on a more fundamental democratic claim to "*determine its own future as free as possible from external interference or domination by another nation or collection of nations*" [Murphy 2001: 374]. This differs from Tan's account of culture in that PMs are not only entitled to simply a fair share of wealth but, more fundamentally, to national recognition and power.

Such an approach might promote more sincere integration within a more diverse Europe because of the positive psychological effect it has on views of the EU. To highlight this point, I believe it is useful to talk of the psychological dimension of shared citizenship, which is just as crucial yet more difficult to achieve in contexts like the EU. The *psychological dimension* of shared citizenship offers a new way of understanding the relationship between citizens and the EU. Complimenting other dimensions of citizenship that tend to emphasize rights, entitlements, or even obligations, it better explains the extent in which peoples feel a sense of connection to others. Speaking to this added dimension, Carens [1996-1997: 113] states that "*(one) way to belong to a political community is to feel that one belongs, to be connected to it through one's sense of emotional attachment, identification, and loyalty.*" This has appeal because it does not demand a shared identity as such, but implies that reinforcing EU citizenship, including its social justice dimension, requires a *positive mutual identification* with the EU. Everyone should feel positively reflected and respected in shared relationships and institutions despite having different identities or worldviews. The psychological dimension explains why western European states feel that the EU's values should expand into eastern and southern states. It also explains why these other states have little trust that the richer states fully respect or consider their perspectives. More optimistically, such a view speaks to a fundamental basis for building shared institutions that both mirror existing national differences and reflect the ways that they collectively wish to move forward, truly together in diversity. For all member states to be motivated in such a project requires that every one of them be equally respected and equally able to influence such a project.

Conclusion – the EU's Present and Future

There is little doubt that many see the EU as a continental project that should one-day approach 40 to 50 members. Of the three positions discussed, the EU tends to use the compensatory approach by standing firm on what it means to be in the EU and offering convincing socio-economic incentives to bring PMs into the fold. Any deviation from this approach tends to simply accept the dilemma as presented. In either case, the EU overlooks the challenges brought on by not addressing the dilemma as part of the integration process. The dilemma not only goes a long way in explaining why wealthier states like Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland still sit outside the EU, but also why the EU is increasingly dealing with serious threats like the euro crisis and the potential of a declining or fluctuating membership.

This is not to suggest that EU values and norms are wrong. Many of them should be vigorously upheld. Yet, the EU takes things too far when it starts demanding a singular set of economic rules that have disproportionate impacts on different members and regions. If the goal is to integrate all of Europe, economic homogeneity will favour some and harm others – by both maintaining power imbalances and destroying national cultures in many weaker EU states and PMs. Some may be willing to pay such a price on the way to a western standard of living. But it may be that such a standard never comes. PMs take a significant gamble when they join the EU. A key way of minimizing the risk for PMs joining, and the risk of the EU struggling, is to minimize the dilemma in the process of accession negotiations. Of course, this could drag things out, and could pose practical problems both in terms of stalling negotiations and heightening risks in areas like security and the economy. Balancing these issues is important. Though solving that problem is left for others to consider, at least for now, I end with one final question: wouldn't a more stable union indeed serve many of these other interests?

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