Acta Politologica

Does Antagonism Precede Agonism in Challenging Neoliberalism?
The Gezi Resistance in Turkey

Pelin Ayan Musil[1]

Abstract:

Mouffe argues that the effective way of challenging the power relations in liberal demo-cratic capitalism is to embrace agonism, not antagonism. That is, the left should acknowl-edge the contingent character of the hegemonic configurations in liberal democracies, and in order to put liberty and equality into practice, it should similarly adopt hegemonic tac-tics. Such tactics include the disarticulation of existing practices as well as creation of new discourses and institutions. Yet, by stating that 'the task of democracy is to transform the antagonism into agonism,' Mouffe also implies that antagonism should precede agonism and thus contradicts her very position of how to challenge the neoliberal order. Indeed, the anti-neoliberal movements that occurred in Latin American countries in 1990s as well as in New York, Greece, Spain, and elsewhere during the occupy movement in 2010s show that without the emergence of antagonism, there is no room for the development of democracy in an agonistic way.
In defense of this argument, this article conducts a within case research in Turkey in order to attain a deeper analysis of how the rise of a social movement can transform the con-flicts and power relationships in neoliberalism from being hidden to being visible: The social movement in Turkey helped in the discursive construction of a left-wing identity that repre-sented 'everything but the repressive and authoritarian government' and thus acted as the neoliberal government's constitutive other. Prior to the appearance of the social movement, yet, the hegemonic articulations of the neoliberal order prevented agonistic politics from arising in the first place. This article thus argues that the agonistic approach of democracy can only emerge following an open antagonistic construction of the we/they relation in a neoliberal order.

Key words: *neoliberalism, antagonism, agonism, power, state, social movement, Gezi, Tur-key*

Introduction

In her famous work *On the Political* [2005], Chantal Mouffe convincingly argues that the specificity of democratic politics is not the overcoming of the we/they opposition but on the contrary, drawing the very distinction between the two. It is only when the conflict in the we/they relationship is apparent that we can talk about democracy. In fact, what she considers as the *central deficiency of liberalism* is that it seeks an understanding of plural-ism which sees the world we live in as a place that brings together "*many perspectives and*

[1] Pelin Ayan Musil is a faculty member at the School of International Relations and Diplomacy at Anglo-Ameri-can University in Prague and a research fellow at the Faculty of Social and Economic Studies at Jan Evangelista Purkyně University in Ústí nad Labem. Contact: pelin.ayan@aauni.edu.

values and that (...) they constitute an harmonious and non-conflictual ensemble" [Mouffe 2005: 10]. This is problematic because it presents a hegemonic conception of 'the political' through which it is impossible to determine what is social and what is political independently of any contextual reference [Mouffe 2005: 17].

Mouffe thus presents the two means of distinguishing the 'we' from 'they': *antagonism* and *agonism*. In antagonism, the two sides of the we/they relation are enemies; similar to the Schmittian philosophy, which argues that the salient opposition is between friend and enemy in the political [Schmitt 1976: 26-18]. In *agonism*, however, some kind of common bond exists between the parties in conflict, so that "*they do not treat their opponents as enemies to be eradicated, seeing their demands as illegitimate, which is precisely what happens with the antagonistic friend/enemy relation*" [Mouffe 2005: 20]. Agonistic politics is prized by Mouffe in challenging the hegemonic power relations: An agonistic challenge would not come in the mode of an abstract negation but in a similarly hegemonic way, "*through a process of disarticulation of existing practices and creation of new discourses and institutions*" [Mouffe 2005: 33]. While the role of the left should be to fight for the effective implementation of the ideals of liberty and equality, the agonistic approach is the tool for the left to put its perspective into practice [Mouffe 2005: 32].

Perhaps Mouffe signalized her preference of agonism over antagonism in an earlier piece of work, when she noticed how the liberal-democratic capitalism perceived antagonistic politics as 'irrational' and therefore denied its existence as a result of its impotence in dealing with it [Mouffe 1999: 3]. Perhaps exactly for this reason she calls for agonism so that capitalism and its 'liberal-democratic' face would recognize the legitimacy of the left. After all, antagonistic conflicts are less likely to emerge as long as agonistic relations legitimate political channels for the dissenting voices.

Yet, how can one talk about the effectiveness of channels through which opposition can create alternative discourses when the power relationship between neoliberalism and the left is exceptionally unbalanced?[2] Such channels may exist, but the extent to which they can be used for an effective struggle against the domination of the power networks established among neoliberal actors is limited. After all, aren't the dissenting voices tolerated as long as they remain marginal and do not change the status-quo?

The achievement of agonism becomes even more problematic when the power of neoliberalism is defined according to the governmentality literature. That is, if neoliberalism is a system of rule, a "*meta-regulation*" [Peck, Tickell 2002: 400] that "*develops indirect techniques for leading and controlling individuals without at the same time being responsible for them*" [Lemke 2001: 201], then how is it possible that the left can even create any channels of raising voice and challenging the neoliberal structure? Any conventional means of leftist criticism would rather add more power to the domination of neoliberalism in the way that it would legitimize its identity as being "tolerant" or "democratic."

This article thus argues that the struggle against neoliberalism first needs to emerge in an *antagonistic* fashion between the neoliberal order and the left. Actually, when Mouffe [2005: 20] concludes, "*the task of democracy is to transform antagonism into agonism,*" she implicitly admits that antagonism precedes agonism, confronting her very own position. Antagonism is a necessary step for agonism because the conflict between the two forces first needs to change its form from being latent to being public. In other words, there is

---

[2] For the conception of unbalanced power relations, see for example Emerson [1962] who discusses that "the power of A over B is equal to, and based upon, the dependence of B upon A." [Emerson 1962: 33]

a need to uncover the hidden power structures of neoliberalism and their exertion of re-pression over the left.

In order to support this line of argument, this article suggests analyzing the nature of the relationship between the anti-neoliberal social movements and neoliberal govern-ments. As an example, the article discusses the emergence and roots of the *Gezi* resistance movement in Turkey in depth to shed light on how agonistic politics was not possible in the first place, and how the emergence and the maturation process of the antagonistic rela-tionship between the resistance movement and the neoliberal government publicized the previously hidden conflicts and power relations in the system.

While this article acknowledges that neo-liberalism cannot be reduced to a single set of philosophical principles or a unified political ideology, nor is necessarily linked to a particular political apparatus [Larner 2000: 21], it discusses the antagonism between so-cial movements and neoliberalism by mainly analyzing their relationship with the *neoliberal state*. It argues that the role of the state – as one of the major institutional actors of the neoliberal project – is still distinctive: It acts as the engine of the whole system. Unlike the other actors, it can publicly manifest its repressive face when the rules of the system are attacked by counter-hegemonic structures, which in return unmasks the political conflicts between neoliberalism and left-wing groups in an antagonistic way. The repressive behavior of the state thus facilitates the alteration of the form of power that neoliberalism exercises: It changes from being three dimensional to one-dimensional in Steven Lukes' terms.

This article is structured as follows: The first section explores the role of the state in the power structure of neoliberalism as discussed through the perspectives of governmen-tality and neo-Marxism. It theoretically discusses why agonistic politics cannot emerge in certain circumstances. Second section posits the current theories of social movements and how they can help to replace the prospects of agonism with their antagonism. The rest of the article is devoted to methodology and an in-depth case analysis of Turkey in order to find an empirical ground for what is argued in the theoretical section.

Neoliberalism, Power Structures and the Role of the State

According to Wendy Larner [2000], the analyses that aim at understanding neo-liberalism are threefold: Neoliberalism as a policy framework, neo-liberalism as an ideology and neo-liberalism through the lens of governmentality.

Conceptualization of neoliberalism as a policy framework is the most prevalent one in the literature, which demarcates it as a procedure of open economy and distmantling of the state through exportation of manufactured goods, privatization of state-owned companies and deregulation. The definition focuses on the extension of markets and logics of competi-tiveness with a hostility toward all kinds of Keynesian strategies. This literature also empha-sizes that the agenda of neoliberalism in 1990s moved from the 1980s' "active destruction and discreditation of Keynesian-welfarist institutions" to policies focused on "the purposeful construction and consolidation of neoliberalized state forms" which is socially more interven-tionist [Peck, Tickell 2002: 384]. Clinton and Blair's "Third Way" approach following Reagan and Thatcher showed such transition. This process is also known as the normalization of the neoliberal economic management. Others call it "post-neoliberal order" [Cortes 2009].

Neo-liberalism as an ideology focuses on the neo-Marxist understanding of hegemony and power. Adopting a Gramscian framework of analysis and referring to

Thatcherism as the first emerging face of neo-liberalism, the New Left Review in 1980s characterized neo-liberalism as "*a state strategy to reestablish the conditions for sustained capitalist accumulation*" [cited in Larner 2000: 11]. In this framework, neoliberalism is a hegemonic project. As Barnett successfully argues, the project refers to two related propositions:

> "*Firstly, that political dominance is exercised by the formation of coalitions amongst different interests; and secondly, that the primary medium for suturing together such formations is a set of coherent ideas and images about the world. This second aspect of theories of 'neoliberal hegemony' in turn has a double aspect. Hegemonic ideas are supposed to tie together different elite actors within a ruling bloc; but they are also supposed to do the rather more ordinary ideological work of legitimizing the political subordination of whole populations.*" [Barnett 2005: 8]

In this way neoliberalism brings to the forefront the hegemonic ideas, which combine individual choice and free market with – paradoxically – more traditional conservative ideology based on family and nation. Neoliberalism thus relies on what Steven Lukes [1974] calls the "third dimension" of power. There is domination, and the dominated, willingly or unwillingly, give consent to their domination. Thus, the effect of power operates at a more invisible level as the actors unwittingly follow the dictates of power even against their best interest. Yet, the Gramscian framework of neoliberalism acknowledges that the universe of political discourse is not monopolized by such hegemonic ideas. Oppositional identities, in particular those of social movements, are constructed in a way that the articulations between hegemonic and oppositional claims give rise to new political subjectivities and social identities which then enter into the "*discourse of restructuring*" [Larner 2000: 12].

The governmentality literature on the other hand follows a neo-Foucauldian perspective of post-structuralism, arguing that neoliberalism involves forms of governance that encourage both institutions and individuals to conform to the norms of the market. In other words, neo-liberal strategies of rule operate in diverse realms including workplaces, educational institutions and health and welfare agencies, which encourage people to see themselves as individualized and active subjects responsible for enhancing their own well being [Larner 2000: 12].

Despite the nonconformities between these approaches, which interpret neoliberalism through particular perspectives, all three approaches address the authoritarian nature of state power. Even the governmentality approach refers to a mutation of state-power that allows for the more precise regulation of conduct at a very detailed level [Barnett 2005: 10]. For sure, in the neoliberal system of rule, power does not reside within one institution – not even the state – but rather within the networks between institutions that structure society [Castells 2007]. However, the role of the state is still distinctive compared to other actors in the way that it acts as the engine of the whole system. As Peck and Tickell [2002: 381] put it, "*while rhetorically antistatist, neoliberals have proved adept at the (mis)use of state power in pursuit of these goals.*"

Neoliberalism requires a strong state, which is positioned to serve the interests of profit-making. It becomes repressive when it comes to controlling the natural phenomena

that hamper competition (e.g. the creation of monopolies, or price instability). To name some examples, during the neoliberalization process in Argentina and Turkey, the political realm was dominated by charismatic neo-populist leaders, Carlos Menem and Turgut Özal respectively. With their charismatic and top-down style of policy making in an environment of weak checks and balances, they had the advantage of accelerating the reform process [Öniş 2006: 245-246]. On the other hand, the Washington Consensus, which was initiated by the US to create liberal economics and pro-democracy incentives in Latin America in 1980s, led to the introduction of highly executive and non-consultative procedures within government and reduced access to the state [Grugel 2009: 33]. Yet, for instance, in Mexico, the legacies of corporatism and the fact that labor-based parties were in government in the 1990s, meant that labor movements could not simply be ignored in the reform process [Cortes, 2009: 54]. Thus, during Mexico's transition to neoliberalism, under President Salinas, the corporatist method of governance was supplemented by a new form of clientelism, more amenable to the neoliberal model [Teichman 1996: 11].

In fact in Latin America in general, the so-called reform of the state was carried out via "*a highly centralized process of decision making*" characterized by "*behind-the-scenes negotiations*" between elites [Grindle 2000: 6]. The period between 1989-2001 is marked by social and political rebellion in Latin America against economic liberalization and such elitist democracy [Grugel 2009: 38-39].

While 'the state as a top-down decision-making institution' is known to be one of the attributes of neoliberalism, the governmentality literature emphasizes how states are not simply functional bureaucratic apparatuses, but also powerful sites of symbolic and cultural production. Fergusan and Gupta [2002] successfully depict, for instance, how perceptions such as 'state is above the society' and 'state encompasses its localities' are produced through routine bureaucratic practices in India. Under such circumstances, in which the state stands as the guardian of the neoliberal project, it would be idealistic to expect that agonistic politics could find effective means of challenging the neoliberal structures.

Anti-Neoliberal Social Movements

When agonistic politics cannot develop to the extent that it can successfully challenge neoliberalism to put liberty and equality into practice, antagonism arises, in which the two parties in conflict do not recognize the 'legitimacy' of the other. Just because agonism is not possible in a structure of hidden power relations and interest configurations, antagonism becomes the only means to publicize the hegemonic articulations of the system of rule. Yet, it requires a certain form, a mechanism or an organization to manifest itself. Social movements provide such mechanisms. What they say and what they do mirrors the constitutive other of a neoliberal rule of government.

There are three main considerations as to why and how social movements come into existence. First, they emerge in the form of a "*spontaneous, unorganized, unstructured phenomenon with institutional and organizational behavior*" [Morris 1999: 53, cited in Morris 2000: 445]. In this view, emotions and ideologies create mass enthusiasm, collective excitement, rumors and mass hysteria, which form the basis of social movements. The second view, which is also known as the political process model, emphasizes the role of actors that make use of informal networks, preexisting institutional structures and formal organizations in generating the movements [Morris 2000: 446]. In other words, people mobilize and

engage in collective action through collective vehicles, informal as well as formal [McAdam et al. 1996: 3]. The third view, known as the *political opportunity structure view,* emphasizes the mobilization of resources external to the group [Tarrow 1994: 85]. In other words, it argues that movements are likely to emerge only when favorable changes occur in the external political system (i.e. emerging divisions among the political elite, new external allies, etc).

Anti-neoliberal social movements have emerged in various countries, definitely as a reaction to certain types of voids in the system. In most cases, they occurred spontaneously, without prior planning; yet through the help of already existing institutional networks. For instance, Spain's Indignados Movement emerged in 2011 at the moment when the economy came to a halt, when budgets and salaries were cut and youth unemployment rate rose to an enormous extent. The ongoing small-scale protests in Spain turned into a robust movement, once the protests were held in May 2011 in the center of Madrid where the repression by the police was quite fierce. Many sympathizers, in return, joined within a few hours and formed the movement. The Indignados Movement in Spain, according to some authors, triggered the whole global Occupy Movement, an international protest movement emerging in various market economy countries against social and economic inequalities, for which the global capitalism is responsible [Barnett 2011].

The movements were partially also inspired by the *Occupy Wall Street* act that took place in the Zuccotti Park, New York, in September 2011 when a Canadian, anti-consumerist, pro-environment group/magazine initiated the call for protest with assistance from a Manhattan-based public relations firm. The ensuing series of events helped to raise media awareness of the key issues that the movement emphasized, such as income inequality, corruption and wealth distribution in the US. The Occupy Wall Street protest then continued until the protestors were forced to leave their location by the police.

In Greece, another clear example of severe resistance against neoliberalism, the movement also emerged out of an already existing dissatisfaction and dozens of small-scale strikes that were taking part in several cities in May 2011. The movement expressed a new form of reaction and anger against the country's deepening economic crisis and harsh austerity measures. Without the existence of any impulse by a political party or trade union, the movement managed to attract far more numbers than could have been expected. Until the fall of the Papandreou government, the movement took the form of massive civil disobedience and challenging the power of the state as represented by the police who tried to stop the protests.[3]

An important common denominator of these movements was not only that they were initiated against neoliberalism in general, but that they targeted government policies and austerity measures. In other words, they emerged as a reaction to national governments that had chosen to ally with the global capital interests at the expense of social and labor rights that should have been protected, according to the protesters' point of view. In all cases, neoliberalism's hidden repressive face emerged when the government used forceful, firm measures by physically removing the protesters from their locations that they aimed to *occupy*.

In this sense, what is known as the *framing process* in social movement theory, emphasizing the role of cultural dynamics that hold the group together, deserves a careful attention so that the discursive construction of the antagonistic relationship between the

[3] Corporate Europe Observatory (2012). *The resistance movement in Greece: challenges and alternatives.* April 2012. [Online, cit. 2013-10-1]. Accessed from WWW <http://corporateeurope.org/eu-crisis/2012/04/resistance-movement-greece-challenges-and-alternatives>.

government as the agent of neoliberalism and the agents of social movements is understood. Perceptions like 'acting collectively may redress the shared problems' ideas, rituals, grievances are central to the survival and sustenance of social movements [McAdam et al. 1996: 5]. Framing occurs not only through what the movements say but also through what they do – through their choices of tactics and the connections between their actions and rhetoric [McAdam et al. 1996].

Even though the literature already posits the social movements as the oppositional identity of hegemonic neoliberal structures and implies their antagonistic character, the analysis needs to be grounded in a detailed investigation of one case in order to show how the process of a social movement's identity construction transforms the conflict between the hegemonic and oppositional groups from being hidden to being observable. It is the tools, symbols and the satirical language they use during the framing process, the form it takes – either structured or unstructured – and its constant interaction with the counteracting hegemonic entity, that reveals the conflict.

Methodology

This research retains various elements of an interpretivist research design. Indeed, the initial aim of this research was very context-specific: The *Gezi* movement, which was triggered on May 31, 2013, brought together huge numbers of Turkish citizens living in Turkey and abroad. Its emergence was quite unexpected not only for social scientists but also for the left-wing intellectuals who had been criticizing the government policies for long. There were several small-scale protests taking part in various parts of the country, but none of these protests had reached such a level. So the initial research strategy was based on this curiosity.

Almost impossible to conduct this research as an outsider, as the positivist scientists always aim at, the research embodied the effort of a direct participant of the movement to make sense of what it stood for and aimed at, which ultimately shaped the main argument of this article.

The research process of this study, almost instinctively, started in an iterative and recursive way [Schwartz-Shea, Yanow 2011: 31], one discovery leading to another. It aimed to capture the understandings, feelings, tactics, choices that shaped the identity of the social movement. The data collection process continued within a three-month process, simultaneously with the effort of framing the domain of the research. It included participant observations in Istanbul and in Prague (where the researcher resides), non-structured interviews with the protesters in public forums held after 25 June 2013, and an analysis of the social media and left-wing web portals from 31 May 2013 to November 2013.

Case Overview: Turkey

The Turkish experience with neoliberalism started in the 1980s. Following the military coup in 1980, ANAP (*Anavatan Partisi* – Motherland Party) under the leadership of Turgut Özal followed a neoliberal strategy based on concrete oppression and control of labor to enhance the surplus-value creation process so as to satisfy the need of large-scale domestic capital groups [Ercan, Oguz 2007: 199]. Privatization was taken on Turkey's policy agenda since 1986 with the Privatization Administration (PA), a key layer of the emerging neo-liberal bureaucracy. There was a desire on the part of the incumbent ANAP government to

sell public enterprises; yet as major Turkish firms were in their early stages of development from purely domestic-market oriented to export-oriented firms, the privatization process was quite slow. Moreover, foreign investors were discouraged given the environment of macroeconomic instability, subsequently, after the downfall of the ANAP government in 1991, Turkish politics was marked by ineffective coalition governments [Onis 2011]. All of these factors then led to a major economic crisis in 2001.

Following the crisis in Turkey, not only the IMF's role strengthened in the country, but also the EU announced Turkey as candidate country for membership. Thus, external actors provided a strong impetus for legal and institutional changes favorable to large-scale privatization [Onis 2011: 714]. Now that the AKP, the moderate Islamic party under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, came to power as a single party government in 2002, there was not much barrier left against the pursuit of concrete neoliberal policies. Indeed, Turkey has experienced a major privatization boom after 2002 [Onis 2011]. Foreign and domestic capital were equally visible participants in the privatization process. Indeed, the AKP is considered as a typical example of "internationalist nationalism" by Ercan and Oguz [2007: 185]. That is, the AKP discourse oscillates between nationalism and internationalism according to the changing balance of forces among different sections of capital. In response to the demands of its main support base – the internationalizing domestic capital groups looking for further state support in their vigorous project of integration with the world market – the AKP often uses an internationalist discourse that seeks further integration with the EU. When it comes to securing a "good deal" for these domestic capital groups, on the other hand, it resorts to nationalism [Ercan, Oguz 2007: 185].

While Turkey, on the one hand, reached impressive levels of economic growth, on the other hand, it concurrently experienced a more conservative and authoritarian tone in government's social and political strategies as part of the neoliberal policy framework. As the Freedom House country report [2013] indicates, Turkey's civil liberties rating declined from 3 to 4 due to the incarceration of thousands of individuals – including Kurdish activists, journalists, union leaders, students, and military officers. According to Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), by the end of 2012, 49 journalists were behind bars, compared to 8 a year earlier. On the other hand, while the constitution stipulates an independent judiciary, in practice, the government influences judges through appointments, promotions, and financing [Freedom House 2013]. Thus, having limited checks and balances on its power since 2002, the AKP government has had an active, dominant role in shaping the state apparatus and societal norms in line with its own ideology.

When Agonistic Politics Is not Possible

Lukes [1974: 50] accepts the fact that it is difficult to identify the process or mechanism of power in its third dimension. Yet, he argues that such an exercise involves inaction rather than (observable) action. In other words, the failure to act in a certain way may well have specifiable consequences, which can be identified by considering that the actions in question would have led to appearance of a political issue. Thus, the neoliberal forms of power that make the conflicts latent could be observed through the *inaction* of the agents, which ultimately prevents agonistic politics from arising in the first place.

An important evidence of inaction could be given in the analysis of the aftermath of *Hopa* events in Turkey. In May 2011, the local residents of Hopa, a town in the northeast

of the country, protested against the construction of a hydroelectric dam that would threaten their community with displacement and disrupt their access to nearby water sources. During their clash with the police, a retired professor died and about 35 people were arrested. The death of the professor produced some small-scale protests in big cities like Istanbul and Ankara, among which there were more arrests, especially among the youth.

What stands as "action" in the *Hopa* case indeed is constitutive of a larger-scale inaction. Because the events took part in a remote part of the country, they lingered as marginal and did not mobilize the masses. The fear of being arrested was what remained in memories. Moreover, the AKP was re-elected as a single party for government office in November 2011, this time taking fifty per cent of the votes. As one leading left-wing intellectual remarked on a TV channel, "this whole (inactive) process is indicative of the normalization of arrests and deaths of protesters among the Turkish population."[4] Indeed, the *Hopa* events were the last. There were many other instances of protests against privatization and neoliberal policies (i.e. the demolition of the *Emek* movie theater, the 4+4=4 education system); yet all these policies and protests were considered as "normal" by the majority.

On the other hand, the media in Turkey also contributed to inaction. While the media should ideally act as the guarantor of political liberties and governmental accountability, they can also be manipulative and subversive of individual freedom and political choice [Neuman 1991]. In the latter form, the elites not only set the policy agenda but also carefully structure the information they convey to the public [Gunther, Mughan 2000: 3]. The media in Turkey had a clandestine link with the government. Arikan's art work on "Network of foundations and corporations through shared board members" [2010] successfully sheds light on the hidden power-relationships of the neo-liberal structure which also reveal the nested connections between media companies and the government elite in Turkey. The work, analyzing the network of interrelationships between powerful economic foundations and the government through disclosing their shared board members, shows how power is shared in these networks. To give one example, the biggest media company of Turkey, the Dogan Group, which owns the major TV stations and newspapers, is connected to government and the major holdings who are under the mandate of the government through multiple shared board members.

In addition to these power networks, the legal environment in Turkey encourages self-censorship: In 2012, some journalists who were critical of the government lost their jobs [Freedom House 2013]. In an interview, Can Dundar, a well-known journalist admits that during the period he worked for *Milliyet*, one of the most popular dailies in Turkey, he was told to make news "which should not disappoint the Prime Minister, Erdoğan."[5] Thus in the environment of self-censorship, critical and independent journalism was highly undermined, leading to fear among journalists to engage with news that disagree with government policies and causing inaction.

---

[4] *Ece Temelkuran "Siz ne zaman bu kadar zalim oldunuz?"* June 10, 2011. [Online, cit. 2013-10-1]. Accessed from WWW <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JCsdoZgTofo>.

[5] RADIKAL (2013a). *Can Dündar: 12 Eylül sansürünü özledim*. [Online, cit. 2013-10-9]. Accessed from WWW <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/can_dundar_12_eylul_sansurunu_ozledim-1154608>.

"The *Gezi* Resistance in Turkey" as the Antagonistic Mirror of the Neoliberal Government

What started as a peaceful protest by a small group of environmentalists against the construction of a shopping center in a public park, sparked into a popular anti-government resistance movement in Turkey. Gezi, as the name of the park goes, not only became the epicentre of the social movement but also gave its name to it, Gezi Resistance. Within two days, there was a sudden influx of Turkish residents toward the Gezi Park, while people from over sixty provinces across the country and citizens living abroad gathered in parks and public squares, shouting slogans "In Solidarity with Gezi (*Gezi Dayanışması*)" and "Everywhere is Gezi, Everywhere is Resistance (*Her Yer Gezi, Her Yer Direniş*)." There was an explosion of social media activism, mainly through Twitter and Facebook accounts, which continuously focused on the coverage of clashes between the activists and the police as well as demonstrated public resentment of the government, targeting particularly prime minister Erdoğan, business companies and mass media that cooperated with them. As argued by Atak [2013], the fact that the mainstream news media ignored the incidences in the first few days of the movement amplified the use of social media.

From the emergence phase to its maturation, the antagonistic relationship between the Gezi Resistance and the AKP government was constructed mutually both in the ways they portrayed each other and in the ways they reacted against each other in their dialogues. In other words, antagonism was revealed at the ideational level rather than in actions. It was the discourses that gave meaning to the actions. The instances of such antagonism can be found in several rherotics observed since the emergence of the movement.

"Peaceful Civilian Protest" vs. "Brutal Police Force": Public surveys conducted among the protesters and the international news agencies indicated that it was the government's denial of the right to protest and the violence used by the police that touched a nerve and started the wave of anti-government demonstrations [KONDA 2013]. While a protest with an environmental cause carries ideas that already stand in opposition to the profit-oriented values of neoliberalism, it is the combination of this cause with its emphasis on the "right to protest" that made the antagonism visible between the we/they relation. In other words, the right to protest for the protection of the environment was forcefully denied by the government. From the perspective of the protesters, if not all, the government should have tolerated at least the exercise of this right, as it has the most peaceful and universalistic cause among others. At least it should not have been treated as brutally as it was by the police. In this sense, the major antagonism in the we/they relation emerged to be between the ideas of "peaceful civilian protest" and "brutal police force", which were discursively constructed by the actors of the Gezi Resistance with various tactics and symbols. The following message was extensively circulated in social media by protesters, which equated the brutality of the police with the profit-oriented interests of the government:

> "*Citizens tired of a bullying government with its corrupt management of public spaces and reckless abuse of land are coming together to protect a public park in the heart of the Istanbul which is under the threat of being demolished so that the 94th shopping mall can be built in its place. People are holding together in spite of the brutal attacks by the police (today's*

attack was at 5am in the morning one shall point out) including tear gas bombs, burning the tents, hospitalizing a person (...) Meanwhile, public spaces are sold to hotels, precious ecosystems are being wasted for more industry, power plants, 3rd bridge over Bosphorus!"[6]

The message shows that the protesters perceived the police that attacked the protestors using physical force synonymously with the AKP government and its neoliberal economic policies. In other words, the police became the face of the AKP government in the streets.

Lady in Red: Gezi Resistance used some important symbols in depicting the we/they antagonism through "peaceful civilian protest" vs. "brutal police force". The first one is known as the "lady in red". In the very first days of the protests, Ms. Ceyda Sungur, an academic at a university in Istanbul, was among a small group of people who made their way to the park to defend it from the bulldozers. She was wearing a red summer dress and carried a white shoulder bag. When one of police officers in the park fired pepper spray directly into her face, the jet sent her hair curling upwards. As she turned, the masked policeman sprayed down her back. A Reuters photographer, captured this moment [Harding 2013]. The image showing an unprovoked attack by police against an unarmed woman became the symbol of the whole Gezi Resistance and the aforementioned antagonism. The photo was disseminated extensively in social media, while posters and graffiti forms of the photo were published.

Standing Man: Another symbol was the standing man (*duranadam*). A man who simply stood silently and motionless for six hours at the centre of Taksim Square became an icon of the movement and inspired several other protesters. Indeed, Taksim Square symbolically, with its monument to the founders of modern Turkey and the scene of bloody battles on May Day over the decades, has also been the epicenter of the whole resistance movement. The act was carried out by a performance artist, Erdem Gunduz on June 6, 2013, and conveyed an ultra-pacifist message on behalf of the Gezi resistance versus the brutality of the police attacks.[7] As word of the 'standing man' spread, people started standing still at significant sites in Turkey, which targeted the various fortresses of the neoliberal rule, such as the mainstream media centers and TV channels who allied with the government through not covering the news of the resistance. The acts of "standing in silence" took place in front of several other shopping malls that are present in Istanbul as well as inside a courthouse, which became famous through its lawyers who were forcefully removed and arrested by the police when they joined the resistance on June 11, 2013. Perhaps the antagonism was most evident when "standing in silence" simultaneously took place exactly facing the spots where five victims of the resistance were killed as a result of police violence. The protestors chose to articulate their anger in a creative and non-violent way.

Penguins: Another symbol of the antagonistic distinction between the neoliberal government and the Gezi was a satirical one, the penguin. A couple of days earlier, CNN-Turkey refrained from showing the intense police violence in the streets by showing the

---

[6] Message shared in the online statuses and several public forums of Facebook on June 1, 2013.

[7] Images and news on the Standing Man can be found in international media channels, social media forums regarding *Gezi* Resistance in Turkey around the dates June 6-18, 2013. A typical news report can be found in BBC News published on June 18, 2013. BBC (2013). *'Standing man' inspires Turkish protesters in Istanbul*. June 18, 2013. [Online, cit. 2013-10-1]. Accessed from WWW <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-22949632>.

movie "The March of the Penguins" even though CNN-International provided live footage of the brutal means used to disperse demonstrators. The protesters started using penguin image in various ways to demonstrate the media censorship in Turkey. It came in the form of penguin masks, balloons, and inflatable toys in the streets whereas in social media several satirical penguin-themed cartoons were shared. As Hintz [2013] puts it, the protesters' flooding of the internet and the streets with the images of penguins revealed, in a way, "the Turkish media's general reluctance to portray Erdoğan's government in a negative light." In other words, the hidden power relationship between the media and the government became evident through the symbol of penguins.

Hence the antagonistic conflict was made public within the resistance through the themes of civility, peaceful silence, wittiness which stood contradictory to the brutal face of the neoliberal state, which came in the form of police violence, teargas and water cannons.

Earth suppers: Another very important form of antagonism came through the concept of Earth supper (*Yeryüzü Sofrasi*) that was organized by protestors in various cities during the Ramadan. Earth supper, which was based on setting a long dining table on the ground, symbolized a modest way of ending the fast day in contrary to the luxury suppers in big hotels. In fact, one of the earth suppers on July 9, 2013 was on purpose set in Istiklal street near Taksim Square, where the AKP municipality was also serving supper in a luxurious way for about 1 500 people. The two suppers being held at the same time revealed the difference between the anticapitalist and Muslim protestors and the AKP's neoliberal identity. The earth supper concept also reinforced that the resistance was not about the portrayal of the polarization between the Kemalist secularists and the religious groups, which is one of the domestic issues endemic to Turkish politics. Rather it was a reaction against a more universal concern, against the neoliberal and antidemocratic policies of the government.

Public forums: When the protests were conveyed from streets and social media to public forums held in open air parks – symbolizing Gezi, the Resistance changed its form from being an articulation of anger against and discontent with government policies into an open and independent public debate about political issues and proposing alternative solutions to them. As noted by Yaylaci [2013], the forums were a demarcation of Habermasian understanding of deliberation and participation of political debate, which would give birth to 'public opinion' on matters common to all. Indeed, the forums were named as instances of 'direct democracy' by protesters themselves in social media. Such an idea of democracy stood also in big contrast with the conception of democracy that the AKP government and the Prime Minister Erdoğan uttered continuously in media. He constantly emphasized that his party, having received almost fifty per cent of votes in the previous elections, was legitimately elected, which justified the right to carry out controversial projects like the redevelopment of Gezi Park. At a conference held in Istanbul on June 7, 2013, Erdoğan, in his debate with EU Enlargement Commissioner Štefan Füle, stated that "People have said what they had to say at the ballot box. Instead of going to the Gezi Park or Kuğulu (the park where demonstrators in Ankara gather) and ravaging, they should go to the ballot box."[8] In this sense, Erdoğan's understanding of democracy as parliamentary majority is typical of the populist approach that neoliberalism finds its practice in most electoral democracies.

---

[8] GIRGIC, C. (2013). *Füle and Erdoğan diverge over democracy*. Euractiv Turkey. June 10, 2013. [Online, cit. 2013-10-1]. Accessed from WWW <http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/istanbul-fuele-erdogan-diverge-d-news-528436>.

In addition to his comments on what democracy is, the statements that PM Erdoğan used in referring to the demonstrations also had a constitutive effect on the antagonistic relationship between the Gezi Resistance and the government. In one of his public speeches, which is illustrative of many other talks that he gave throughout the Gezi resistance, it was himself, who drew the we/they distinction in an antagonistic way. He referred to the protesters as illegal, marginal groups, traces of the "deeper state" meaning the conspiratorial groupings in the military and government and moreover "foreign forces" trying to sabotage the well-going Turkish economy and the successes of his government.[9]

The evaluations of left-wing intellectuals on the Gezi resistance need due attention as they agreed that the hidden merciless power of the neoliberal government was finally publicized through this arising social movement and the relationship was of an antagonistic kind. Ece Temelkuran, a left-wing journalist and author, wrote that: "For the first time we do not need media to see the cruelty of the government that was already taking place in remote parts of Turkey. Because now it occurs in the heart of Istanbul; anyone who goes out to streets witnesses the brutal face of the government's power."[10] On the other hand, Sirri Sureyya Onder, a left-wing parliamentarian, columnist and artist, commented "In Gezi, there is life. That is what the government fears most. It did not fear the protests or the rebellions. I think they feared the joy of this movement. That joy brought some very unusual sensation to this land."[11] Indeed, through signifying the "joy," Önder referred to the fact that the Gezi resistance turned into a movement, which represented everything but the repressive and authoritarian government. The joy that came as a result of this group identity was settled as opposed to fear. It was depicted in the streets when protesters intercepted the water-cannon vehicles with their guitars or with big smiles on their faces. Moreover, the movement united several opposing political views in the same platform including secular nationalists, Muslim youth that used to vote for the AKP and pro-Kurdish party supporters.[12] The fact that these groups could tolerate one another, unified by one motive, was astonishing given the polarized nature of Turkish politics. As one pro-Kurdish party member mentioned in an interview, "for the first time, the Turkish flags and the portraits of Ataturk carried by nationalists do not bother me. For the first time, I can stand these people."[13]

Besides, the movement did not have any noticeable forerunner. As spontaneous as it emerged, it did not give birth to any leadership. While leaderlessness may be considered to hamper the success of the social movements, it was a major component of the Gezi identity that constrained the capabilities of the government. As Dündar noted, "the fact that Gezi resistance did not have a leader put a spoke in the government's wheel. The leaders in Turkey either died while running on the treadmill or were caught ill in bed. Now, neither

---

[9] RADIKAL (2013b). *Başbakan Erdoğan: İllegal paçavralar astılar* [PM Erdoğan: They hanged illegal scraps]. June 11, 2013. [Online, cit. 2013-10-1]. Accessed from WWW <http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/basbakan_erdogan_bu_cevre_hassasiyeti_degil-1137142>.

[10] TEMELKURAN, E. (2013). *Gezi Parkı: Türkiye'de devrim mi oluyor?* BBC Türkçe. [Online, cit. 2013-10-1]. Accessed from WWW <http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2013/06/130605_turkiye_gezi_ece_temelkuran.shtml>.

[11] MILLIYET (2013). *Sırrı Süreyya'dan ilginç Meltem Cumbul sözleri*. [Online, cit. 2013-10-11]. Accessed from WWW <http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/sirri-sureyya-dan-ilginc-meltem/siyaset/detay/1776007/default.htm>.

[12] Various unstructured interviews and observations by the author at Yogurtcu Park Public Forum, Istanbul between June 12-28, 2013.

[13] Interview by the author, June 13, 2013.

can they pull us down from the treadmill, nor get us into bed."[14] Indeed, Önder characterized Gezi resistance as "anti-political," which meant an antagonistic reaction, not against the political, but against the face, representation and implementation of the political in the public realm.[15] The leaderlessness of Gezi resistance, in this sense, constituted an antagonism against all faces of politics run by leaders.

Conclusion

This article, based on the case of *Gezi* resistance in Turkey, argued that there is no place for agonistic politics in a neoliberal political order where the conflicts are made latent through various powers, most importantly by the state. It is antagonism that can bring the unobservable conflicts up to the surface, and it is social movements that carry and diffuse such antagonistic character against the neoliberal state. That is why antagonism precedes agonism in the struggle for liberty and equality in a neoliberal structure.

The *Gezi* case further demonstrated the adaptation of the Schmittian understanding of the friend-enemy relationship to the context of anti-neoliberal social movements. In *The Concept of the Political,* Schmitt [2008 (1932): 26] argues that the distinction between friend and enemy is based on "*the utmost degree of intensity of an association or dissociation.*" Such intensity can be found in the willingness to fight and die for/with other members of one's group and the willingness to kill others for the simple reason that they are members of a hostile group [Schmitt 2008 (1932): 32]. As the Turkish case shows, even though the antagonism between the *Gezi* Resistance and the government was intense in the sense they were both perceived as *illegitimate* by one another, there was no such willingness to die or kill other members of the group. The antagonism – in the friend-enemy relationship – was rather produced in the meanings of actions. As the police aimed to supress the resistance through physical force; the agents of the resistance responded even through more peaceful protests. Or, as the prime minister defined democracy as "majority of votes," the protesters created public forums to initiate "direct democracy." Thus, the Schmittian conception of political antagonism is more related with meanings of actions rather than the actions themselves in the antagonistic relationship between the social movement and neoliberal government in Turkey has shown.

That being said, a final lesson learnt from this case is that the *framing process in social movements is constitutive of its outcome*. Such outcomes are not necessarily materialistic ones, as political opportunity structure theorists look for; i.e. whether a social movement can lead to the downfall of a government or not. Unmasking the neoliberal structures of domination and facilitating the imagining of alternative worlds are enough to account for political impact, as the Turkish *Gezi* Resistance shows. The appearance and maturation of social movements during the framing process, which is in constant antagonism with neoliberal policies, forces the governments to react, which usually comes in the form

---

[14] RADIKAL (2013a). *Can Dündar: 12 Eylül sansürünü özledim*. [Online, cit. 2013-10-9]. Accessed from WWW <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/can_dundar_12_eylul_sansurunu_ozledim-1154608>.

[15] EMEKDUNYASI (2013). *Sırrı Süreyya'dan HDK'ya ve Sol'a çarpıcı ,Gezi' eleştirisi*. [Online, cit. 2013-10-9]. Accessed from WWW <http://www.emekdunyasi.net/ed/siyaset/21666-sirri-sureyyadan-hdkya-ve-sola-carpici-gezi-elestirisi>.

of physical oppression. Such oppression is already an exposition of the hidden severity of neoliberalism that claims to have a tolerant and democratic identity.

REFERENCES:

ATAK, K. (2013). Uprisings in Turkey: Preliminary Thoughts and Questions from Social Movement Theories. *Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey*. Vol. 2, No. 4., pp. 49-54. ISSN 2052-7004.

BARNETT, C. (2005). The Consolations of 'Neoliberalism'. *Geoforum*. Vol.36, No. 1, pp. 7-12. ISSN 0016-7185.

BARNETT, A. (2011). *The Long and the Quick of Revolution. OpenDemocracy.* [Online, cit. 2013-10-1]. Accessed from WWW <http://www.opendemocracy.net/anthony-barnett/long-and-quick-of-revolution>.

BBC (2013). *'Standing man' inspires Turkish protesters in Istanbul*. June 18, 2013. [Online, cit. 2013-10-1]. Accessed from WWW <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-22949632>.

CASTELLS, M. (2007). Communication, Power and Counter-power in the Network Society. *International Journal of Communication*. Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 238-266. ISSN 1932-8036.

Corporate Europe Observatory (2012). *The resistance movement in Greece: challenges and alternatives.* April 2012. [Online, cit. 2013-10-1]. Accessed from WWW <http://corporateeurope.org/eu-crisis/2012/04/resistance-movement-greece-challenges-and-alternatives>.

CORTES, R. (2009). Social Policy in Latin America in the Post-neoliberal Era. In GRUGEL, J.; RIGGIROZZI, P. (eds). *Governance after neoliberalism in Latin America*. 1st edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 49-66. ISBN 0–230–60442–0.

Ece Temelkuran "Siz ne zaman bu kadar zalim oldunuz?" June 10, 2011. [Online, cit. 2013-10-1]. Accessed from WWW <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JCsdoZgTofo>.

EMEKDUNYASI (2013). *Sırrı Süreyya'dan HDK'ya ve Sol'a çarpıcı ,Gezi' eleştirisi*. [Online, cit. 2013-10-9]. Accessed from WWW <http://www.emekdunyasi.net/ed/siyaset/21666-sirri-sureyyadan-hdkya-ve-sola-carpici-gezi-elestirisi>.

EMERSON, R. M. (1962). Power-dependence Relations. *American Sociological Review*. Vol. 27, pp. 31-40. ISSN 0003-1224.

ERCAN, F.; OGUZ S. (2007). Rethinking Anti-Neoliberal Strategies Through the Perspective of Value Theory: Insights from the Turkish Case. *Science & Society*. Vol. 71, No. 2, pp. 173-202. ISSN 0036-8237.

FERGUSON, J.; GUPTA, A. (2002). Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality. *American Ethnologist*. Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 981-1002. ISSN 1548-1425.

FREEDOM HOUSE (2013). *Turkey Country Report. Freedom in the World 2013*. [Online, cit. 2013-9-28]. Accessed from WWW <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/turkey>.

GIRGIC, C. (2013). *Füle and Erdoğan diverge over democracy*. Euractiv Turkey. June 10, 2013. [Online, cit. 2013-10-1]. Accessed from WWW <http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/istanbul-fuele-erdogan-diverge-d-news-528436>.

GRINDLE, MS. (2000). *Audacious Reforms: Institutional Invention and Democracy in Latin America.* Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. 288 p. ISBN 0-8018-6420-8.

GRUGEL, J. (2009): "Basta de Realidades, Queremos Promesas": Democracy after the Washington Consensus. In GRUGEL, J.; RIGGIROZZI, P. (eds). *Governance after neo-liberalism in Latin America*. 1st edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp. 25-48. ISBN 0-230-60442-0.

GUNTHER, R.; MUGHAN, A. (2000). *Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 516 p. ISBN 0-5-2177-743-7

HARDING, L. (2013). *Turkey's Resistance Image Forged as Pepper Spray Burns Woman in Red Dress.* The Guardian. 5 June 2013. [Online, cit. 2013-10-1]. Accessed from WWW <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/05/turkey-lady-red-dress-ceyda-sungur>.

HINTZ, L. (2013). The Might of the Pen(guin) in Turkey's Protests. Foreign Policy Middle East Channel. [Online, cit. 2013-10-1]. Accessed from WWW <http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/06/10/the_might_of_the_penguin_in_turkey_s_protests?wp_login_redirect=0>.

KONDA. (2013). *Gezi Parkı Araştırması* [*Gezi Park Research*]. June 6-7, 2013. [Online, cit. 2013-10-1]. Accessed from WWW <http://www.konda.com.tr/>.

LARNER, W. (2000). Neo-liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality. *Studies in Political Economy*. Vol. 63. pp. 5-25. ISSN 1918-7033.

LEMKE, T. (2001). 'The Birth of Bio-Politics': Michel Foucault's Lecture at the Collège de France on Neo-liberal Governmentality. *Economy and Society*. Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 190-207. ISSN 0308-5147.

LUKES, S. (1974). *Power: A Radical View*. London: Macmillan Press. 64 p. ISBN 978-0-333-1667-2-7.

MCADAM, D.; MCCARTHY J. D.; MAYER N. Z. eds. (1996). *Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Framing Processes – Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements. Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-20. ISBN 0521485169.

MILLIYET (2013). *Sırrı Süreyya'dan ilginç Meltem Cumbul sözleri*. [Online, cit. 2013-10-11]. Accessed from WWW <http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/sirri-sureyya-dan-ilginc-meltem/siyaset/detay/1776007/default.htm>.

MOUFFE, C. ed. (1999). *Introduction: Schmitt's challenge. The Challenge of Carl Schmitt.* London: Verso, pp. 1-17. ISBN 1-85984-244-5.

MOUFFE, C. (2005). *On the Political*. London: Routledge. 144 p. ISBN 0-4-153-0521-7.

MORRIS, A. (2000). Reflections on Social Movement Theory: Criticisms and Proposals. *Contemporary Sociology.* Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 445-454. ISSN 0094-3061.

NEUMAN, W. R. (1991). *The Future of the Mass Audience*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 220 p. ISBN 0521424046

ÖNIS, Z. (2006). Varieties and Crises of Neoliberal Globalisation: Argentina, Turkey and the IMF. *Third World Quarterly*. Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 239-263. ISSN 1360-2241.

ÖNIS, Z. (2011). Power, Interests and Coalitions: The Political Economy of Mass Privatisation in Turkey. *Third World Quarterly*. Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 707-724. ISSN 0143-6597.

PECK, J.; TICKELL, A. (2002). Neoliberalizing Space. Antipode. Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 380-404. ISSN 1467-8330.

RADIKAL (2013a). *Can Dündar: 12 Eylül sansürünü özledim*. [Online, cit. 2013-10-9]. Accessed from WWW <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/can_dundar_12_eylul_sansurunu_ozledim-1154608>.

RADIKAL (2013b). *Başbakan Erdoğan: İllegal paçavralar astılar* [PM Erdoğan: They hanged illegal scraps]. June 11, 2013. [Online, cit. 2013-10-1]. Accessed from WWW <http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/basbakan_erdogan_bu_cevre_hassasiyeti_degil-1137142>.

SCHMITT, C. (2008). *The Concept of the Political (Der Begriff des Politischen)*. Translated by George Schwab. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 126 p. ISBN 0-226-73892-2.

SHWARTZ-SHEA, P.; YANOW, D. (2011). *Interpretive Research Design: Concepts and Processes*. London: Routledge. 200 p. ISBN 0-4-15-87808-X.

TARROW, S. (1994). *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 251 p. ISBN 0-5-214-1079-7.

TEICHMAN, J. (1996). Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Mexican Authoritarianism. *CERLAC WORKING PAPER SERIES.* No. 6. York University.

TEMELKURAN, E. (2013). *Gezi Parkı: Türkiye'de devrim mi oluyor?* BBC Türkçe. [Online, cit. 2013-10-1]. Accessed from WWW <http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2013/06/130605_turkiye_gezi_ece_temelkuran.shtml>.

YAYLACI, S. (2013). Reclaiming the Public Sphere in Turkey: Arendtian and Habermasian Interpretation of Forums. *Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey.* Vol. 2, No. 8, pp. 11-18. ISSN 2052-7004.