

The Rise of New Political Parties and Re-Alignment of Party Politics in the Czech Republic¹

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Abstract:

The party system of the Czech Republic has traditionally been considered as a case of exceptional stability in the region of East-Central Europe. It was also almost a perfect example of unidimensional competition. This persistence and stability was undermined by the results of the 2010 and especially 2013 election, which brought the unprecedented rise of new anti-establishment political parties. Using aggregate data, the article analyses the geographical patterns and socio-demographic background of electoral support of the new political parties in the Czech Republic. The main outcome of the article is that the explanatory power of the left-right dimension has been significantly weakened. Consequently, the rise of the new parties should not be seen as a “substitution” but rather as a “transformation” of Czech party politics.

Keywords:

political parties; cleavages; Czech Republic; anti-establishment parties; elections; voters

Together with Hungary and Slovenia, the Czech party system has traditionally been considered as one of the most stable party systems in the region of post-communist East-Central Europe. A change in this view was brought about by the elections of 2010 and 2013, which were characterized by a sharp drop in support for established parties and the rise of new parties, founded on protest-oriented, populist programs (see Hloušek and Balík’s article in this issue). The goal of this article is to analyse the character of this electoral change in the Czech party system. Are the results of the 2010 and 2013 elections a true “transformation” of patterns in party competition, or is the rise of new parties simply an indication of the “substitution” of political actors without a basic change in patterns of electoral support? We attempt to find the answer to this question using the

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theoretical concept of cleavages, which have been successfully used for explaining party politics in the Czech Republic since 1989. Despite the fact that the Czech Republic is not the only example of the rise of new parties, including those that can be described as centrist or exclusively populist parties (Učeň 2004; Havlík, Pinková 2012), the extent of the electoral change has been exceptional both in terms of the electoral gains and number of the new successful parties. Therefore, the results of the study can be used as a starting point for analysis of a change of other similar cases of formerly stable or stabilized party systems, both in Western (Team Stronach in Austria, The Five Star Movement in Italy) and in East-Central Europe (Ordinary People and Independent Personalities in Slovakia, Positive Slovenia or Miro Cerar's Party in Slovenia).

The text is structured in the following way: the first part offers an overview of the concept of cleavages with particular emphasis on the region of post-communist East-Central Europe. The next part of the text offers background information on the Czech party system before 2010, with emphasis on the identity of political parties, voter behaviour, and the structure of cleavages. This is followed by an explanation of the research strategy, data, and methods. The final part of the text presents the results of analysis and a discussion of results, which show that the rise of new parties in the years 2010–2013 demonstrate a substitution effect to a certain extent, but in larger part represent a transformation in the context of the Czech party system.

1. Cleavages and party politics in Post-Communist Europe and the case of the Czech Republic

One of the most influential approaches to research on voter behaviour and the form of party competition is based on the concept of cleavages. The concept of cleavages was defined by Stein Rokkan and Seymour M. Lipset in their seminal work from 1967 and equated the transformation of societal divides to political competition. In other words, it can be said that the basic condition of the existence of cleavages is objectively existing social conflicts. These are resultantly reflected in political attitudes or demands, which form the basis on which voters select political parties that represent these divides in society. Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair (1990: 215; see also Deegan-Krause 2006; Kriesi 2011) further discuss three elements of full cleavages: *“an empirical element, which identifies the empirical referent of the concept, and which we can define in social-structural terms; a normative element, that is the set of values and beliefs which provides a sense of identity and role to the empirical element, and which reflect the self-consciousness of the social group(s) involved; and an organizational/behavioral element, that is the set of individual interactions, institutions, and organizations, such as political parties, which develop as part of the cleavage.”* As explained in detail below, due to the type of data used (aggregated data), the study seeks to explain only empirical element of cleavage politics in the Czech Republic.

A similar approach to the study of the cleavage structure of politics can be found for example in a text by Hazama (2003) on the effect of social cleavages on a party system in Turkey or in an article about electoral dynamics in Post-Communist Europe by Tavits (2005). Nevertheless, it is sufficient for exploring the suggested change of the patterns of electoral support of the main political parties.

The transformation of West European societies in recent decades, which can be observed for instance in the weakening of ties of voters to political parties, an increase in electoral volatility and the consequent rise of new political parties, especially those of the New Left and New (Populist) Right (Ignazi 1996; Lane, Ersson 1997; Poguntke 1995), is reflected in the research on cleavages as well, especially with the abandoning of a “rigid” sociological perspective and the broadening of the concept, which does not necessarily require the need for deep social differences to be an essential condition for the existence of cleavages – the so-called “political” concept of cleavage, often referred to as an *issue divide* (Deegan-Krause 2006). Studies based on reactions to social transformations were also conducted to supplement the original four defined by Rokkan and Lipset, focused on value-oriented positions rather than on socio-demographic characteristics of voters (for a discussion on *value-based cleavages*, see e.g. Kriesi 2011). The most well-known of these “new” cleavages are those of a materialistic-postmaterialistic nature as defined by Ronald Inglehart (Inglehart 1977; Inglehart 1984), or the “cultural divide” (Bornshier 2011) respectively, or “new politics or authoritarian vs. libertarian values” (Stubager 2011), with some authors focusing on the importance of foreign policy or the issues connected with the process of European integration (e.g. Lijphart 1990). Despite the arguments that such an approach to cleavages diverges from Rokkan and Lipset’s original concept, the concept has remained a useful and constructive tool for the study of party politics in western Europe (e.g. Deegan-Krause, Enyedi eds. 2011; Kriesi et al. 2008; Kriesi et al. 2012).

A strong appeal for the use of the concept of cleavages was also articulated after the fall of communist regimes and the establishment of competitive party systems in the region of East-Central Europe after 1989. In the cases of societies (de)formed by four decades of communist rule, with the long interruption – or in some cases, total absence – of democratic tradition, the analysis of party politics with the aid of the basic concept of cleavages proved to be even more difficult than of the western European cases of societies marked by social transformation. Some authors (Roskin 1994; Stefan-Scalat 2000) using the concept in the post-communist environment eventually abandoned it in view of the virtual nonexistence of social stratification and with it the lack of the social and political “moorings” of political parties.

Although attempts at the application of Rokkan’s approach in its pure form have not proven to be especially successful, the so-called *tabula rasa* hypothesis (see Kitschelt 1995 on the term) has not been empirically

confirmed either. Many authors have demonstrated the existence of a link between various socio-demographic characteristics, such as political attitudes and voting for political parties (for an overview, see e.g. Deegan–Krause 2006; Evans 2006). As Stephen Whitefield put it, “*political cleavages have emerged in each state across the region that reflect the country’s historical inheritances as well as its post-communist and economic and social experiences*” (Whitefield 2002). The form, number, and relevance of individual cleavages thus vary not only among countries in the region, but also over time. As an example of a multi-dimensional party system, consider the case of Poland. There, the party system of the 1990s demonstrated a unique mix of socioeconomic divides combined with an urban-rural cleavage with the parallel presence of a centre-periphery cleavage (Zarycki 2000), but a transformation of the party system after the turn of the millennium led to the rise of a specific values conflict between conservatism and liberalism (Hloušek, Kopeček 2004). The party system also underwent a deep transformation in Slovakia, in which the form in the 1990s centred on the conflict of the (democratic) character of the regime, but later shifted to party competition dominated by the rift between a socioeconomically defined left and right (as well as long-standing conflicts in that society concerning the substantial minority of ethnic Hungarians – see Hloušek, Kopeček 2008). The Hungarian party system is marked by an otherwise unidimensional cleavage, though it differs from the current model in the countries of Western Europe as the contents of the cleavage consist of a values divide between social liberalism and ethnic nationalism (Evans, Whitefield 1995; Enyedi 2005; Tóka 2004). Evaluating party politics in the Baltic states (and similarly in Bulgaria after the turn of the millennium) is still more complicated, due to the high level of electoral volatility and the frequent change of party actors. The exception, from the perspective of party competition near the model of the majority of western European party systems, has been Slovenia as well as the Czech Republic insofar as these nations have demonstrated a characteristic amount of stability of relevant parties (both in terms of numbers as well as from the point of view of voter support), an element of unidimensional party competition (with the dominant conflict falling along a socioeconomically defined right and left). In the following section of the text, we describe in detail the development of the Czech party system, which will function as a starting point for further detailed analysis of the nature of the changes which Czech party politics has experienced in recent years.

As in other countries in the region, the first few years after the fall of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia brought about a high level of fragmentation in the party system and a high degree of volatility; nevertheless, from the elections of 1996 until those of 2006, it was possible to speak of a stable party system, at least when seen from the perspective of the amount, character, and levels of voter support of individual parties (Bakke, Sitter 2005; Havlík 2015a).


The party system of that time was characterized by the presence of two major poles: the liberal-conservative Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana - ODS), and the centre-left Czech Social Democratic Party (Česká strana sociálně demokratická - ČSSD). Each of these was able to repeatedly win 25-35% of the votes and formed the backbone of government coalitions. Two minor poles were represented by the radical left Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy - KSČM) with a voter support oscillating around 12% of the vote, and the somewhat right-of-centre Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party (Křesťanská a demokratická unie – Československá strana lidová - KDU-ČSL), which typically won about 7% of the electorate and relied in particular on the support of Catholics in the region of South Moravia (an exception occurred in 2002, when the Christian Democrats campaigned in coalition with the Freedom Union (Unie svobody - US). These four were accompanied by smaller, generally liberally oriented political parties such as the aforementioned US, which grew out of internal clashes within the ODS, Civic Democratic Alliance (Občanská demokratická aliance - ODA), and the Green Party (Strana zelených - SZ). In the years 1992–1998, the radical-right populist Association for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (Sdružení pro republiku – Republikánská strana Československa - SPR-RSČ) was also represented in the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of Parliament). Although the high stability of political parties and their electoral support was accompanied by relatively low predictability of coalition patterns (Strmiska 2006; Havlík 2015a), the permanent feature of Czech party politics was the dominant position of a socioeconomically defined right-left cleavage. While Klára Vlachová and Petr Matějů (1998: 1) have argued that the political space in the Czech Republic is in fact defined along two dimensions (in addition to the right-left axis, they also detected a libertarian-authoritarian one), on the basis of their analysis of data on the characteristics and attitudes of Czech voters, they also concluded that *“the left-right axis, which has been gradually taking its traditional socio-economic content, is clearly dominant and thus represents the main structural cleavage of the Czech political spectrum.”* A similar result was reached by an analysis of data from an expert survey conducted by Otto Eibl and Roman Chytilík (2011), which also demonstrated that the dominant conflict dimensions were primarily forged along economic lines and the legacy of the previous regime, with a second (markedly less important) dimension was related to themes associated with social liberalism. The empirical studies cited here thus confirm the conclusions drawn by Vít Hloušek and Lubomír Kopeček (2008) and Fernando Casal Bertoa (2014), speaking of the dominant position of socioeconomic cleavage. Lukáš Linek (2013, see also Vlachová, Řeháková 2007) also discussed the decisive influence of social class and right-left orientation (in point of fact socioeconomic cleavage), but at the same time noted the decisive role of religion (and to some extent age) in the case of KDU-ČSL. A similar result

using aggregated data was reached by Tomáš Kostecký (2011: 124), who pointed out *“quite stable voting patterns.... [M]ost of the spatial variation in electoral preferences can be attributed to structural differences among districts. Key underlying factors explaining spatial variation of party electoral results are of socio-economic nature.”*

In sum, it was possible to consider the Czech party system as stable, developed around a dominant structurally as well as attitudinally grounded socioeconomic cleavage, with the exception of the electoral support of KDU-ČSL, with its roots in the Catholic segment of the population.

The elections of 2010 and 2013 called the stability of the party system into question for the first time since it was established at the beginning of the 1990s. Both elections were characterized by the marked successes of new political parties and, at the same time, a corresponding drop in the support of established parties. It resulted in a steep rise of volatility, mostly accounted for in the rise of the new political parties (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Evolution of volatility and gains of new political parties in the Czech Republic (1992–2013)



Source: (Powell, Tucker 2014; Sikk 2005), author’s calculation

From the point of view of the development of the party system and the cleavage structure, what is important is the fact that three of the four new parties crafted their campaigns around populist rhetoric with a strong anti-establishment appeal. Leading up to the 2010 election, Public Affairs (Věci veřejné - VV) accused the “political dinosaurs” (the established parties) of corruption and offered a programme of elements of direct democracy and direct voting to a wide range of public offices. In that election, VV won 10.9% of the votes and 24 seats out of 200 in the Chamber of Deputies (Havlík, Hloušek 2014). Direct democracy was also the key rallying point for the campaign of Tomio Okamura’s Dawn of Direct Democracy (Úsvit přímé

demokracie, henceforth as the Dawn) before the Chamber elections of 2013. Okamura, a businessman of Czech-Japanese origin, promised among other things an “end to the mess and corruption” in the Czech Republic, and with 6.9% of the votes gained 14 seats. An anti-establishment appeal was also made by the campaign of the Action of Dissatisfied Citizens 2011 (Akce nespokojených občanů - ANO), which was founded by the billionaire owner of the Czech Republic’s largest agriculture and chemical corporation, Andrej Babiš. He systematically accused the established political parties of incompetence, and promised that his experience as a successful businessman would help him to run the state efficiently, as a firm would. A massive election campaign provided ANO with 18.7% of the votes and 47 seats (Havlík 2015b). All three of these parties had in common the fact that they avoided labelling themselves on the right-left axis (along which lay the dominant conflict faults in Czech party politics during the previous years), though VV presented itself as a centre-right alternative to ODS (especially shortly after VV was established) and Babiš occasionally described his movement as centre-right (Parlamentní listy 2013). These three parties differed from the fourth new party, TOP 09, which won 16.7% of the vote and 41 seats in 2010 (in 2013, the party gained 12% of the vote and 26 seats). TOP 09 emerged after the more right-oriented wing of the KDU-ČSL, led by Miroslav Kalousek, broke off from the party, and presented itself as a “purifier” of centre-right conservative-liberal politics in the Czech Republic (Hanley 2012).

The Czech party system thus underwent a notable change in terms of relevant actors in the years 2010–2013. The question remains whether and how this change occurred in the patterns of voter support, particularly in the context of the unidimensionality of party competition with the dominant divide of right and left and voter decisions determined by socio-demographic characteristics vis-à-vis the refusal of new parties to identify with right-oriented or left-oriented politics (nevertheless conscious of the fact that VV and ANO, especially at the beginning of its existence took a centre-right approach).

The main research question is thus the following: did the entrance of new parties mean the *transformation* of the dynamics of the party system in the Czech Republic, or was it simply a *substitution* of established parties?

The answer is found through the examination of evolution of support of the political parties and of relation between societal segments and electorates of parties. We focus mainly on patterns in evolution, not on particularities in voting behaviour. Therefore, the priority of our research is to test hypotheses on the “party” level and the exact ways that voters from certain social groups are connected to parties is rather second-order question for this text.

2. Data and methods

In case of the inability to obtain information about the individual behaviour of voters, aggregate data functions as an appropriate source of information about the characteristics and changes in voter support of individual political parties as such has been repeatedly used in research of party systems, including those in the countries of the post-communist region (Kostelecký 2011; Tavits 2005). The analysis contained in the text is developed on a data set that comes from two sources – the Census of People, Homes, and Apartments from the years 2001 and 2011 and the voting results of elections to the Chamber of Deputies. The data are related to two levels of aggregation – the local and microregional. To work with the maps (see below), data from microregions – so-called “municipalities with extended competences” (obce s rozšířenou působností, ORPs) were used; there are 220 of these the Czech Republic. For regression and correlation analysis, data on the level of municipality were used. In light of this, Prague was divided into 15 sections, and other previously divided towns were merged, the final dataset contains 6 083 cases. Considering that the cause of possible change in the patterns of voter support need not be the entrance of a new party, but instead could be the result of long-term developments, it is necessary to examine a longer time period than just the period in which the elections presented new parties in the system. With a view to the development of the party system, the time period of the research stretches from 1996, when the Czech party system was largely consolidated, to 2013, when the most recent elections took place.

The *transformation* of the party system can be observed in the aggregate data in various different ways. One of them is the association of support of political parties including “taken” or “base” areas, in which the support of established parties was concentrated. We consider a situation in which it would not be possible to identify a significant difference between electoral support of new parties and the established ones as a sign of the *transformation* of patterns of voter support. Alternatively, it is possible to speak of *substitution* of the established parties with the new parties. The core of the analysis is a comparison of the distribution of voter support of individual political parties in a delimited area and over time, in which we utilize cartograms for purposes of efficient use of space. Cartograms – maps – allow us to capture the results of multiple political parties in a given election in a single image. To capture the “taken” or “base” geographical distribution, among individual parties, we thus use a method of “area electoral support”, which consists of identifying areas (in our case the Municipalities with Extended Competences – ORPs) which form 50% of the most successful areas (meaning ORPs) in terms of the support of the particular political party (Jehlička, Sýkora 1991). An analysis of the map is supplemented by a correlation analysis of the correspondence of new-party voter support with that of the established parties in the preceding elections.

An analysis of the socio-demographic basis of voter support allows us to ground the success of new political parties in the context of long-term developments of the party system, particularly as it concerns the aforementioned dominant role of socioeconomically defined conflict between right and left (as well as the role of the conflict of church-state) based as it is on social stratification (with a view to an absence of data of political attitudes, we thus operate on the level of “pure structural voting” – see Deegan-Krause 2006). In the case of a significantly diverging relationship between socio-demographic characteristics and electoral support of new and old parties, it is possible to speak of a transformation of the party system; i.e. a fall in the importance of social stratification on voter behaviour and possibly the formation of a new divide. On the other hand, if a case shows that the importance of social stratification on voter behaviour has not been weakened, and that the success of new parties in the Czech Republic does not bring about a substantial change in the established structure of party competition (it does not re-draw the cleavages), we can only speak of *substitution*.

The development of relationships between the composition of society and electoral support has been obtained with the assistance of an OLS regression analysis. The goal of this statistical method is to evaluate the relationship between single dependent variables, which in our case are the election results of individual political parties, and one or more independent variables, which involve data on the structure of society. Any observed dependence is expressed by the basic parameters of the regression model. The usefulness of the model shows an R-square value, which give the proportion of explained variation of the dependent variable by way of the independent variables (see Field 2009).

The values of individual coefficients thus demonstrate the explanatory power of the variables. Explanatory power of one independent variable over another included in the model is indicated by an unstandardized Beta coefficient. If the value of the Beta coefficient is positive and relatively high, then a high incidence of the phenomenon described by the independent variable indicates a corresponding high level of the phenomenon described by the dependent variable (positive dependence). Conversely, if the value is negative, then a high incidence of the given characteristic reduces the value of the dependent variable (negative) (see Field 2009). To evaluate the changes in patterns of electoral support, it is critical to compare the explanatory power of the model including basic socio-demographic variables in the case of electoral support for established as well as for new political parties.

Regression models used for the study of varying electoral support in territorial subdivisions of the Czech Republic have been described as “composite”, as the compilation of models and the interpretation of results is founded on the conditions of a composite approach (Thrift 1983). The socioeconomic right-left cleavage has been operationalized by the

proportion of employers relative to the total number of economically active residents of a municipality and the proportion of the unemployed. Moreover, employers were separated into those with employees and those without (self-employed). On the basis of the concept of cleavages, both the self-identification of the political parties under study and the available empirical research leads us to expect that this section of the population will exhibit higher support for ODS and TOP 09 in municipalities with a higher proportion of employers; on the other hand, a municipality with a smaller proportion of this economic group should demonstrate stronger support for ČSSD and KSČM. The opposite relationship can also be expected, especially in light of previous research discussing a “generational cleavage” (Linek 2013) and the number of retirees in a municipality.

Unemployment is expressed as the number of unemployed as a percentage of the economically active population. A higher level of unemployment should result in higher support for parties such as the KSČM and ČSSD, although it is necessary to take into account the findings of various authors concerning the relationship of unemployment and penalizing the incumbent parties (Johnston and Pattie, 2004). The church-state cleavage, which has long fit the profile of KDU-ČSL, is determined by the different behaviour of the religious and secularized segments of the population. To operationalize this cleavage, the variable of proportion of Catholics is utilized. Support for KDU-ČSL is expected to increase as the proportion of Catholics increases. Conversely, in the cases of ČSSD and KSČM, voter support for these parties should increase as the proportion of Catholics decreases. Although previous research has not indicated the existence of an urban-rural cleavage, we control for its possible influence on voter support, by using a variable capturing differences in the distribution of the labour force working in industry. The variable is grounded in the types of activities undertaken by the employer. The variable of those involved in the secondary sector is determined by the total number of those employed in industry and construction as a fraction of the total economically active population.

The model also contains an education variable. In societies in transition, higher education tends to indicate a preference for economic liberalism; nevertheless, it can also be used as a proxy for the materialist vs. post-materialist cleavage. The assumption is that more educated people are more oriented to quality-of-life issues, rather than material wealth (Inglehart 1984). The variable of education is thus represented by the number of university-educated people as a proportion of the population over 15 years old. This variable contains both university-educated people, as well as those with advanced professional education. Information about the variables used is available in the database of the Czech Statistical Office.

Finally, weights are used in regression models. Because the municipalities are of different size and therefore have different impacts on overall electoral results, the population of the municipality is part of the model as a weight.

This approach (in comparison to models without weight) diminishes the effect of small municipalities with up to 1 000 inhabitants, which is the most frequent category in the Czech Republic.


3. Results

3.1. Electoral geography and the support of the new parties

The correlation between the electorate of new political parties and established parties in the system is shown by the areas of support on the maps. As noted above, this is concerned with aggregate data, and therefore it cannot be said that in places where original support for “old” parties was replaced by “new” parties that there was necessarily a shift of voters between these parties. The maps only indicate whether or not a party has shown itself to be successful in an area where other parties previously were successful. For reasons of space, only two maps show the coverage area of electoral support of each of the new parties.


Maps 1 and 2 indicate the distribution of voter support of TOP 09 in 2010, with significant apparent overlaps for TOP 09 support with the areas of voter support for ODS and the Greens, especially in Prague and the area surrounding the city, Brno, Pilsen, Karlovy Vary (Carlsbad), and northeast Bohemia, as well as in other major cities (e.g. České Budějovice and Zlín) with ODS. On the other hand, there is relatively weak overlap with support of KDU-ČSL, which is surprising in light of the fact that TOP 09 emerged from a split within KDU-ČSL. Virtually no overlap was noted in the cases of local electoral support for the left-wing ČSSD and KSČM.

Map 1: Overlap of voter support for TOP 09 and other parties (2010 vs. 2006) I.



Source: authors, data from the Czech Statistical Office


Map 2: Overlap of voter support of TOP 09 and other parties (2010 vs. 2006)
II.



Source: authors, data from the Czech Statistical Office


Regarding the electoral support of VV in 2010, there was a difference from TOP 09 (as well as from the established parties) in that there was typically a high level of territorial dispersion, i.e. a high number of ORPs provided local electoral support. One of the results of the low variability of the electoral support of VV in 2010 is thus the absence of a clear pattern of overlap with the local voter support of established parties in 2006. Local electoral support of VV thus overlapped with areas of the highest voter support of ODS, the Greens, ČSSD and even KSCM. An exception to this was KDU-ČSL, whose electoral support at the local level rarely overlapped with that of VV, in light of the relatively low support of VV in South Moravia. The absence of consistency of local distribution of electoral support in the patterns of the established parties' 2006 strongholds points to evidence of a transformation of patterns of voter support, thus the phenomenon of a new division line in the party system, with a previously unseen voting pattern, rather than – as in the case of TOP 09 – the “mere” substitution a new party replacing an old one. Or at least, the patterns of VV support do not resemble those of the old established parties.

Map 3: Overlap of electoral support of VV and other parties (2010 vs. 2006) I.



Source: authors, data from the Czech Statistical Office

Map 4: Overlap of electoral support of VV and other parties (2010 vs. 2006) II.



Source: authors, data from the Czech Statistical Office

The conclusions to be drawn concerning the support of new political parties in 2010 was supported in a correlation analysis as well (Table 3), in which there was a high positive correlation between electoral support of TOP 09

and that of ODS and a moderately strong correlation with voter support from the Greens, as well as a negative relationship with previous support of the parties of the left. From the perspective of electoral support, results of the analysis confirm that the arrival of TOP 09 on the Czech party system can be understood as a new centre-right pole; de facto this meant a “substitution” of ODS and to a lesser degree of the Greens, rather than a “transformation” and the brining about of new voting patterns. In the case of VV, it is not possible to identify a distinct link between electoral support at the local level and previous support of the established parties, only a weak positive correlation with voter support of ODS and the Greens, and a weak negative correlation with support of KSČM. The given findings thus point to a novel pattern of support of VV counter to the previously existing patterns of support of the established political parties.


Table 1: Correlation of the electoral support of the new parties in 2010

	ČSSD 2006	KDU-ČSL 2006	KSČM 2006	ODS 2006	SZ 2006
TOP 09 2010	-0.20	0.00	-0.33	0.60	0.30
VV 2010	0.00	-0.01	-0.19	0.21	0.15

Source: authors, data from the Czech Statistics Office


The elections of 2013 brought an unprecedented rise in electoral support of anti-establishment/populist parties. A look at the map depicting electoral support for Dawn in 2013 does not indicate a systematic correlation between previous (2010) local electoral support of any of the established parties. One of the reasons is the fact that Dawn’s voter support was relatively evenly distributed throughout the Czech Republic, and its local electoral support included a high number of units. The result is a partial overlap with the electoral support of the liberal-conservative ODS (particularly in the eastern areas of the Central Bohemian Region, and parts of the Liberec, Pardubice, and Zlín Regions) and TOP 09 (parts of the Liberec, South Bohemian, Carlsbad, and Hradec Králové Regions) as well as with the left-wing ČSSD and KSČM (somewhat peripheral areas with a traditionally strong position of the left such as in parts of the Pilsen, South Moravian, and Vysočina Regions); however, Dawn also made inroads in south-eastern Moravia vis-à-vis KDU-ČSL (in the Zlín Region, where Okamura himself ran). In contrast to TOP 09 in 2010, but similarly to that of VV in that year, in the Dawn’s case it is not possible to identify a clear overlap of the geographical distribution of electoral support with the previous (2010) results of the established parties. Moreover, although the campaign rhetoric of both Dawn and VV was similar, it is not possible to speak of a notable level of continuity from the local levels of electoral support for VV in 2010 and Dawn in 2013.

Map 5: Overlap of electoral support of Dawn and other parties (2013 vs. 2010) I.



Source: authors, data from the Czech Statistical Office

Map 6: Overlap of electoral support of Dawn and other parties (2013 vs. 2010) II.




Source: authors, data from the Czech Statistical Office

The electoral support of ANO appears similar to that of VV in 2010 and Dawn in 2013, with a low level of variability and slightly greater support in Bohemia, particularly in central and northern Bohemia. From the point of


view on overlap with electoral support of individual political parties in the year 2010, a high degree of correlation with voter support for VV, and to a lesser extent (but particularly in central Bohemia and Prague) a correlation with support for ODS and TOP 09 can be observed. There was some rather exceptional local overlap with voter support of both established left-oriented parties (occurring in parts of western Bohemia and central Moravia), and practically no overlap with previous electoral support of KDU-ČSL.

Map 7: Overlap of electoral support of ANO and other parties (2013 vs. 2010) I.



Source: authors, data from the Czech Statistical Office

Map 8: Overlap of electoral support of ANO and other parties (2013 vs. 2010) II.



Source: authors, data from the Czech Statistical Office

The absence of a clear relationship of support of some of the established parties was not so clearly confirmed by correlation analysis (see Table 4). Here, it is possible to speak of a positive (but still rather low) correlation with support of ODS and TOP 09, but also of VV. Consequently, the analysis of geographical distribution of electoral support of ANO and the slight correlation with the electoral results of both ODS, TOP 09 and VV shows a mix of transformation and a double substitution effect, in which there is some copying of patterns of electoral support of centre-right parties (the first type of substitution) as well as what Kevin Deegan-Krause termed “populist rotation” (Deegan-Krause 2007) which represents the second substitution. On this it is possible, but again only to a limited extent, to speak of this as well in the case of Dawn. A weak correlation with the 2010 electoral support of VV was discovered, but otherwise it is possible to describe the local electoral support of Okamura’s party as unique and new.

Table 2: Correlation of the electoral support of the new parties in 2013

	ČSSD 2010	ODS 2010	TOP 09 2010	KSCM 2010	KDU-ČSL 2010	VV 2010
ANO 2013	-0.12	0.32	0.32	-0.19	-0.14	0.27
The Dawn 2013	0.00	-0.03	-0.03	-0.05	0.07	0.18

Source: authors, data from the Czech Statistics Office

3.2. Electoral support of parties and socio-demographic characteristics

Before performing the regression analysis, it was necessary to control for possible collinearity, which could lead to a distortion of the results of the analysis. Collinearity was tested by use of a correlation analysis, which failed to show a strong linear relationship among any pairs of the individual variables; the values of the Pearson coefficient reached a maximum level of about 0.3.

The explanatory power of the regression models, analysing the influence of selected indicators on the results of individual parties was expressed with R square value. This showed that the relationship of regional differentiation of electoral support of the established parties and socio-demographic characteristics of the local units experienced relatively dynamic development in the years 1996–2013; nevertheless, the main finding is the relatively high explanatory power of the model and at the same time (since at least 1998) stabilization of the relationship of the level of electoral support and characteristics of the local unit, linked primarily by the socioeconomic cleavage of right-left, and in the case of KDU-ČSL, the proportion of Catholics (see Table 5).

Table 3: Determinants of electoral support of political parties (1996 – 2013)

	ČSSD					
	1996	1998	2002	2006	2010	2013
pensioners	0.08	0.10	0.18	0.16	0.26	0.25
high education	-0.11	-0.17	0.07	0.03	0.02	0.05
industry	0.08	0.05	-0.01	0.03	0.02	0.03
unemployment	0.33	0.24	-0.07	0.07	0.06	-0.05
bussinesmen	-0.33	-0.33	-0.29	-0.43	-0.28	-0.27
catholics	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.06	0.03	0.04
R ²	0.44	0.44	0.16	0.38	0.43	0.40
	ODS					
	1996	1998	2002	2006	2010	2013
pensioners	0.10	0.00	0.02	-0.03	-0.02	0.01
high education	0.33	0.36	0.16	0.26	0.20	0.09
industry	0.02	-0.01	0.00	-0.02	0.06	-0.01
unemployment	-0.30	-0.38	-0.28	-0.41	-0.31	-0.18
bussinesmen	0.44	0.53	0.40	0.70	0.40	0.15
catholics	-0.05	-0.09	-0.07	-0.10	-0.04	-0.02
R ²	0.56	0.76	0.69	0.77	0.67	0.63
	KSČM					
	1996	1998	2002	2006	2010	2013
pensioners	0.19	0.16	0.19	0.14	0.11	0.11
high education	-0.21	-0.23	-0.32	-0.23	-0.19	-0.22

industry	-0.03	-0.04	-0.05	-0.04	-0.02	-0.03
unemployment	-0.03	0.01	0.08	0.00	0.01	0.04
bussinesmen	-0.18	-0.19	-0.19	-0.16	-0.07	-0.12
catholics	-0.04	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	0.00	-0.01
R ²	0.25	0.31	0.43	0.38	0.37	0.45
KDU-ČSL						
	<i>1996</i>	<i>1998</i>	<i>2002</i>	<i>2006</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2013</i>
pensioners	0.01	0.04	0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02
high education	-0.09	-0.11	0.15	-0.01	0.05	0.09
industry	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.00	0.03	0.03
unemployment	-0.21	-0.22	-0.21	-0.13	-0.02	-0.07
bussinesmen	0.00	-0.01	0.15	0.02	-0.01	0.00
catholics	0.26	0.24	0.18	0.20	0.14	0.16
R ²	0.70	0.72	0.62	0.72	0.65	0.68
	ODA	US	SZ	TOP 09		SPR-RSČ
	<i>1996</i>	<i>1998</i>	<i>2006</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>1996</i>
pensioners	-0.04	0.01	0.00	-0.10	-0.09	0.07
high education	0.15	0.19	0.12	0.24	0.19	-0.15
industry	0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.03	-0.04	-0.01
unemployment	-0.12	-0.14	-0.07	-0.31	-0.28	0.10
bussinesmen	0.09	0.14	0.08	0.40	0.39	-0.10
catholics	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02
R ²	0.52	0.68	0.61	0.79	0.80	0.19
	VV	Dawn	ANO			
	<i>2010</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>2013</i>			
pensioners	-0.05	0.01	-0.05			
high education	-0.04	-0.05	-0.05			
industry	0.02	0.05	0.04			
unemployment	-0.08	0.02	-0.15			
bussinesmen	0.09	0.06	0.17			
catholics	-0.01	0.02	-0.03			
R ²	0.10	0.35	0.15			

Source: authors, data from the Czech Statistics Office

It is clear that there was a momentary decrease in the power of the model for the year 2002, but nonetheless this can be explained by the two factors. First, there was the so-called “Opposition Agreement” (in which a government of ČSSD was based on the support of ODS, its main rival), and which pulled ČSSD to the centre; second, 2002 saw the candidacy of “the Coalition,” a campaign alliance between KDU-ČSL and US, two parties at opposite sides of the church-state cleavage. In the years 2010–2013, the explanatory power of the model drops in the case of ODS (particularly the influence of the variables concerning business owners and people with

higher education), which can be attributed to the entry of the more ideologically straightforward TOP 09; TOP 09's electoral support has unquestionably been the best explained by the model of cleavages (to which primarily the proportion of business owners and university-education contributes). Previous findings about the entry of TOP 09 into the Czech party system in the form of "substitution" is also confirmed by the result of the regression analysis, at the very least in the sense that local differentiation of electoral support of TOP 09 is well explained by the model of cleavages.

In contrast to TOP 09, in the cases of VV, ANO, and Dawn, the explanatory power of the model (or the individual variables respectively) is very low and suggests that the electoral support of populist parties has "grown out" of the cleavages that have shaped Czech party politics since the beginning of the 1990s. A noted exception is the positive influence of the variable of business owners and the negative influence of the variable of unemployment in the case of ANO, though this only explains the variability of electoral support for Babiš's movement to a very limited extent. In all three cases, we can thus speak of a "transformation," rather than simply a "substitution" effect. This finding is not surprising from the point of view of the campaign profiles of all three parties, rejecting the left-right conception of politics and the defending of the interests of only selected social groups. In terms of the dynamics of the Czech party system, this is no banal finding, if we consider that individual populist parties in the years 2010 and 2013 won 12% and 31% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, respectively. The results of the last two elections to the lower house demonstrate the growing success of parties whose electoral support cannot be explained by an approach which has served Czech party politics well since the middle of the 1990s.

4. Discussion

As the analysis shows, the entry of new political parties, with the exception of the liberal-conservative TOP 09, indicates that in the years 2010-2013, a significant degree of transformation of patterns of voter support has occurred after a long period with a stable party system in the Czech Republic, previously characterized by the resilience of party actors, but also by the dominance of a socioeconomic right-left cleavage supplemented by the influence of Catholic identification in the case of electoral support for KDU-ČSL. Variability of electoral support of the established parties is robustly and consistently explainable in a framework of cleavages, but electoral support of the new protest/populist parties is practically independent of the socio-demographic characteristics of the areas under study (with the occasional exception of ANO, whose electoral support resembles the patterns of support of centre-right parties to some extent but with considerably weaker explanatory power than in case of the "old" established parties). Consequently, in recent years it has become possible to speak of

the developing transformation of patterns of electoral support in the Czech Republic. The framework of cleavages that has successfully explained electoral support in the country seems to have lost a part of its significance. However, additional characteristics concerning the support of the new parties – with possible implications for the future development of the Czech system of political parties – can still be found. The patterns of electoral support of TOP 09 to a large extent copy patterns typical of ODS. ODS – the former main pole on the right side of the axis – thus practically gained a twin in TOP 09, not only from the point of view of its programme, but also in electoral geography terms. This fact, the existence of an alternative can substantially limit ODS's future attempts at its own "resuscitation." In addition, it may find another direct competitor in the form of ANO. The similarity of local patterns of ANO's electoral support with that of ODS' is not quite as unambiguous as in the case of the TOP 09-ODS pairing, but still a link can be identified, similarly as the higher support of ANO in areas with a higher proportion of business owners. The future strategy of ANO will be of crucial importance for ODS. At the same time, efforts to define ANO as the main centre-right actor may be the logical solution now, as retaining the anti-establishment and non-ideological profile seems to be extremely difficult when we take into consideration the flash-performance of several anti-establishment parties in East-Central Europe; parties that have collapsed soon after their electoral breakthrough (see e.g. VV, The Party of Civic Understanding in Slovakia, the Simeon II. party in Bulgaria, or various parties in the Baltic countries). An exception to this, showing the long-term success of an (originally) populist party is the Slovak Smer (Direction), which took a path of ideological self-profiling (in this case, of becoming a social-democratic party – see Havlík, Spáč 2014). On the other hand, it is important to note the current similarities of voting patterns of ANO with VV from 2010, which points to evidence of "populist rotation." To a limited extent, this has also been the case with Dawn, whose pattern of electoral support was not similar to any of the established parties, and the variability of its electoral support is also not explainable by the concept of cleavages.

These conclusions are necessary to examine in light of the character of the data which were used. Aggregate data can only tell us something about patterns of electoral support in the context of different characteristics within the territorial whole. The findings presented here certainly should not be interpreted as information about voters of individual political parties. This is a task for further analysis after the publishing of the appropriate data.

The analysis presented here also could not through its design (and with a view to the absence of appropriate data in times of finishing of this text) answer the question as to which cleavages replaced those that had previously successfully explained the electoral support of Czech political parties. One way to possibly explain these – requiring further analysis of individual data – is to examine issue voting connected to the dissatisfaction with the methods and alleged corruption of the established political parties

or a general dissatisfaction with the functioning of Czech democracy. In light of the different profiles of the new populist parties as well as the partial conclusions of our analysis, it is probably that their electorate will differ in a variety of ways. That, of course, is a subject for future research.

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